Airpower in Counter-insurgencies: Constructive or destructive?
Airpower in Counterinsurgencies: Constructive or destructive? A case study approach to analysing the influence of airpower in counterinsurgency strategies and operations in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan
Abstract (198 Words)
Conflict in the 21st century has up until this point been primarily characterised by prolonged periods of COIN with airpower playing an undeniable role. The GWOT which began after the 9/11 attacks ushered in a protracted period of COIN operations in the Middle East conducted by the US and its allies. During this period the role of airpower evolved and developed, with some such as Dag Henriksen asserting that airpower was an indispensable asset during COIN operations, proving to provide multi-faceted utility. However others suggest that airpower exacerbated hostility toward western COIN efforts ultimately bolstering insurgent support. Through the analysis of operations in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan one is able to ascertain and understand both the positive operational benefits of airpower as well as examine the challenges and criticism levelled against airpower within COIN. This essay focuses on examining these aspects, underlining airpower’s ultimate significance while acknowledging the ever present limitations of airpower, especially in the nuanced terrain of modern COIN. Ultimately while airpower is an undoubted aid to those seeking to wage a successful COIN campaign its effectiveness is dampened by the inherent complexities of COIN warfare necessitating the need for a comprehensive all-encompassing COIN strategy.
Contents
Acronyms…………………………………………………………………………………………3
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….5
Part I: Positive Operational Impacts of Airpower……………………………………….…….8
3.1 Iraq...…………………………………………………………………………………8
3.2 Libya…...…….……………………………………………………………………..10
3.3 Afghanistan……………………………………………………………………...…13
Part II: Challenges and Criticisms of Airpower……...…………………………………...….16
4.1 Iraq...………………………………………………………………………………..16
4.2 Libya…...…….……………………………………………………………………..18
4.3 Afghanistan……………………………………………………………………...…21
Part III: Case-Specific Considerations and Lessons.…………………………………...….24
5.1 Iraq...………………………………………………………………………………..24
5.2 Libya…...…….……………………………………………………………………..26
5.3 Afghanistan……………………………………………………………………...…29
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………...….33
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………..……35
Acronyms
AQI - Al-Qaeda in Iraq
CAS - Close Air Support
CJTF - Combined Joint Task Force
COIN - Counterinsurgency
CRG - Contingency Response Group
DRV - Diyala River Valley
DUE - Dense Urban Environments
GNA - Government of National Accord
GNC - General National Congress
GPS - Global Positioning System
GWOT - Global War on Terror
HUMINT - Human intelligence
IED - Improvised explosive device
ISAF - International Security Assistance Force
IS - The Islamic State
ISIS - The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IS-K - Islamic State – Khorasan Province
ISR - Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
LNA - Libyan National Army
MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières
MEDEVAC - Medical evacuation
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OHCHR - Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIR - Operation Inherent Resolve
OTH-CT - Over-the-Horizon counterterrorism
PRTS - Provincial Reconstruction Teams
RPA - Remotely Piloted Aircraft
SIGINT - Signals intelligence
TTP - Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
UAE - United Arab Emirates
UAV - Unmanned aerial vehicle
UK - United Kingdom
UNSMIL - United Nations Support Mission in Libya
US - United States of America
VBIED - Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device
Introduction
Conflict in the 21st century has been characterised by a series of long-lasting COIN efforts, with airpower featuring prominently throughout. The GWOT, as the era-defining conflict commencing as a result of the September 11 attacks, has led to a prolonged period of COIN operations waged by the US and their allies. These operations, which continue to be conducted as we enter 2024, have seen an evolution in how airpower interacts with COIN operations. Some argue that airpower has proved a vital asset to those in charge of mounting COIN operations. Others, however, argue that airpower serves to fuel the flames of dissent within nations where airpower is employed in COIN, increasing anger toward western powers and support for the insurgent forces. Ultimately, airpower has proven to be a vital tool in the armoury of western nations; however, despite its prominent place in COIN, it has not proven to be the golden bullet some argued it would be.
First and most crucial to the analysis of airpower in COIN operations, one must understand the concept of airpower. Airpower within this essay will be understood as integrated employment of air and space forces to control and exploit the air and space “The environments to achieve objectives, exploiting the properties of its operating medium to realise unique operational characteristics and thus employ unique capabilities to provide a broad range of military options.” Heuseras defines strategy as “a comprehensive way to try to pursue political ends, including the threat or actual use of force, in a dialectic of wills there have to be at least two sides to a conflict". The ideas of insurgency and COIN insurgency will be defined based on the definition used by the US Government Counterinsurgency guide, with insurgency defined as “..the utilising of subversion and violence to challenge political control, involving armed forces to enhance political, economic, and influence activities”. Conversely, COIN will be defined as the integrated civilian and military efforts to contain an insurgency and its causes, combining non-military strategies with military support.
This essay will draw mainly from secondary sources such as books, journals and articles published on airpower, explicitly focusing on the use of airpower in recent years regarding airpower’s utility. An outline of the importance of airpower will be crucial, with its importance highlighted by practitioners such as Dag Henriksen, who states, “Airpower is a fundamental part of operations in Afghanistan, integrated into every decision, scheme of manoeuvre, intelligence-gathering effort, and attack plan. It is available 24/7/365 and provides rapid response, surgical strike, MEDEVAC, resupply, and critical airlift, giving the theatre commander operational flexibility rarely enjoyed in previous conflicts.” Literature such as this, as well as precise analysis of specific operations and battles employed as case studies, will form the basis from which conclusions will be drawn.
With these core definitions confirmed and an understanding of the research obtained, one can determine whether airpower is constructive or destructive to COIN efforts. The first mass and strategic use of airpower for the US in a COIN capacity was the Vietnam War, with US and South Vietnamese forces making extensive use of both fixed-wing and rotary assets. As technology developed, commanders have sought new ways to employ and utilise their assets, with airpower viewed as a critical force multiplier. The beginning of the 21st century and GWOT saw the start of COIN operations across the Middle East, which became the first modern use of airpower in COIN operations. The operation, however, did not prove as decisive as some had hoped. Indeed, some would argue that airpower was detrimental to the COIN efforts of the UK, the US and their allies in nations such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Notably, they argued that when airpower was used in direct action against insurgent forces, it had detrimental effects, such as the increased likelihood of civilian casualties. Furthermore, the use of drone technology further dehumanised the coalition forces engaged in COIN operations, increasing the difficulty of winning over the hearts and minds of the populations and making winning a protracted COIN operation exceedingly more challenging.
By analysing the employment and effectiveness of airpower assets within the respective COIN operations in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan, as well as three large-scale operations involving the mass deployment of western air assets, one can conclude the effectiveness of airpower. This study will be broken down into three core components: the ‘Positive Operational impacts of Airpower’, the ‘Challenges and Criticisms of Airpower’, and finally ‘Case-Specific Considerations and Lessons’. By adopting this approach, one can understand the positive and negative effects of airpower with clear evidence provided by the employment of airpower in the aforementioned COIN operations. Ultimately, the realities of modern conflict limit the complete utility of airpower when looking at COIN in the GWOT and against those waging an insurgency campaign. However, airpower is a crucial tool for commanders and an essential component of any strategy seeking to wage a COIN campaign successfully.
Part I: Positive Operational Impacts of Airpower
3.1 Iraq
Airpower within COIN has had several positive impacts on achieving tactical and strategic goals, demonstrated in Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan. First, looking at the positive effects of airpower in Iraq, one must examine the impact of precision targeting on COIN strategies. Precision targeting employed in COIN helped to mitigate the level of collateral damage and enhance overall COIN operations by reducing civilian casualties. The utility of precision strikes became evident in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, most notably in the strikes carried out against crucial regime and military assets within Baghdad, with minimal levels of collateral damage caused when compared to fewer surgical strike options. This idea is supported by the fact that “by 4 April, the Medin Division of the Republican Guard was estimated to be at less than 18 per cent full strength, and the Hammurabi Division was rated as below 44 per cent”. Furthermore, the use of precision strikes extends in Iraq, with the 2007 Surge against Al-Qaeda in Iraq seeing an intensified air operation, with precision strikes disrupting insurgent networks in areas such as the Anbar Province. Indeed, the use of airpower was crucial in aiding those involved in the Anbar Awakening, with close air support missions significantly increasing the combat effectiveness of tribal forces involved. The ability to provide mass firepower without exponentially increasing collateral damage proved crucial to operational success. Therefore, one can see that the ability to utilise precision targeting within Iraq aided greatly in efforts against insurgent forces while minimising civilian casualties.
Secondly, when looking at the positive impacts of airpower, the rapid response and mobility capabilities created by airpower must be considered, allowing for the quick deployment of forces to critical areas often necessary during COIN operations. This can be seen in Iraq with the fall of Tikrit in 2003, Saddam Hussein's hometown, where airpower facilitated the rapid deployment and protection of coalition forces, allowing for the ultimate success of the operation. Indeed, US commanders believe that the use of assets such as A-10s for close air support combined with strategic airlift capability would be vital to the success of the operations against irregular insurgent forces. Furthermore, the ability to rapidly deploy and mobilise air assets proved crucial in the aiding of Iraq and Kurdish forces engaged in the recapture of the Mosul Dam in 2014. The strikes conducted to support the Iraqi and Kurdish forces helped to protect critical infrastructure at risk of capture. With US Central Command carrying out a total of 94 air strikes across Iraq, with 61 conducted near the Mosul Dam. WIthout such aid, it is unlikely that the Iraqi forces would have been able to maintain their positioning, leading to a possible worsening of the humanitarian crisis present. Therefore, one can suggest that airpower provides a rapid response capability, which few other assets can provide, an asset vital within Iraq between 2003 and 2014.
Thirdly, the ISR capabilities provided by airpower enhance overall situational awareness, allowing for better informed decision making and, as such, a more effective disruption of insurgent activities. The ability to utilise ISR assets proved crucial, especially when operating in built-up areas, as demonstrated by the 2006 Operation Together Forward II, in which joint US-Iraqi operations in Baghdad worked to dismantle insurgent strongholds and IED teams. This is an idea evidenced by the US forces use of a then newly established IED-hunting aerial surveillance unit, Task Force ODIN, which enabled company-sized air mobile platoons to strike and dismantle insurgent operations within Baghdad, acting on intelligence gathered by ISR assets. The utility of ISR assets was further demonstrated in the 2017 battle of Mosul, in which drones provided real-time intelligence which aided in the reduction of civilian casualties and protection of US and Iraqi personnel. Indeed, Major Arnold and Major Fiore state, “The coalition defeated IS’s tenacious defence and liberated Mosul by integrating violent Iraqi ground manoeuvre with advanced US capabilities within Mosul’s militarised DUE.” The aforementioned US capabilities manifested not only in kinetic action but also in the form of near constant ISR provided by assets such as MQ-9 reaper drones, which allowed for the monitoring of ISIS activity nearly constantly. ISR capabilities have greatly improved due to integration with airpower, which has, in turn, aided in the COIN operations within Iraq. Therefore, it can be argued that the combination of precision strikes, rapid response and ISR capabilities aided the US and her allies in COIN operations within Iraq, with airpower providing tactical flexibility not otherwise present, flexibility crucial to achieving tactical success in COIN operations.
3.2 Libya
When looking at the unique nature of COIN operations in Libya and the role played by airpower, it is necessary to first look at where airpower showed its effectiveness. First airpower in Libya was employed with the aim of not only minimising insurgent activity but also minimising collateral damage similar to Iraq. In 2011, the Sirte airstrikes took place, seeing NATO forces conduct airstrikes in aid of anti-Gaddafi forces, with a focus on military installations and command centres. Operation Odyssey Dawn, saw a mass commitment of aerial assets, with the UK alone flying 3,000 sorties out of a total of 26,320 coalition missions flown, with 640 targets being attacked by the UK alone. The operation did, however, inflict larger-than-expected collateral damage, notably after a Danish mission struck an apartment block. Furthermore, the 2018 Operation Derna conducted by the LNA saw airstrikes launched against the city of Derna to minimise collateral damage; however, questionable intelligence led to contention about the operation’s success. Indeed, in 2018, Libya saw a decline in reported airstrikes, from 685 in 2017 falling to 283 in 2018, caused both by the diminishment of insurgent forces but also by the level of civilian casualties caused, with 52 civilians killed in 2017. This highlights the capability of airpower to disrupt insurgent combat effectiveness whilst also exposing one of its weaknesses, as when acting on inaccurate intelligence, surgical strikes can still lead to a high level of collateral damage and civilian casualties.
Secondly, the effectiveness of airpower can be seen in the ISR capabilities that airpower provided, with invaluable real-time intelligence ultimately enhancing COIN operations. During 2015, the US conducted a myriad of drone operations across southern Libya to gather intelligence on extremist groups by monitoring and tracking insurgent movements. This ISR culminated in the US conducting four precision airstrikes in southern Libya in September 2019, with 43 ISIS fighters being killed as a result of airpower ISR capabilities. Furthermore, during Operation Odyssey Dawn of 2011, ISR assets aided in the enforcement of a no-fly zone around Libya, with reconnaissance assets monitoring Gaddafi's forces, contributing to the success of the operation. The operation saw non-NATO nations such as Sweden contribute with ISR-capable Gripen aircraft, as well as nations such as the UAE, Qatar, and Jordan further contributing by monitoring areas in and around Tripoli. This increase in information from assets such as the Swedish Gripen significantly increased air commanders’ situational awareness, allowing for a better understanding of the battle space. Therefore, one can suggest that ISR capabilities provide commanders with unparalleled real-time information essential to understanding and defeating an insurgent force on the tactical and strategic levels.
Thirdly, the psychological impact of sustained airstrikes can weaken insurgent morale, ultimately disrupting their operations and weakening their operational effectiveness. In 2014, the use of airstrikes in Benghazi targeting extremist groups led to a feeling of insecurity among insurgent forces, weakening their morale and the potential radicalisation of local populations due to the perceived external aggression. Beauregard stated that “Emotional theories arguing that
fear promotes learning and anger hinders it would not be able to predict what would happen with mixed emotions.” This took away from any military success that the airstrikes may have achieved. The situation was repeated within the Fezzan Campaign of 2019, where General Haftars LNA conducted a campaign against rebel groups in southern Libya, with the psychological impact of such strikes being notable. Indeed, the UNSMIL documented that there were 20 deaths and 69 injuries as a result of the hostilities across Libya, with the primary cause of casualties listed as shelling, with 62 casualties caused as a result. Despite most deaths occurring from non-air power sources, accuracy and precision targeting when employing airpower is essential, especially when considering the psychological impact of airpower when engaged in COIN operations. Arguably, the psychological effect of sustained strikes is significant, having the capability to, on the one hand, disrupt insurgent operations whilst also making airpower a clear target to which civilians and insurgents can direct anger and hatred, especially when improper targeting leads to civilian casualties. Therefore, it can be suggested that while airpower offered precision targeting and ISR capabilities, there were undoubtedly issues with the use of airpower in Libya, notably the questionable psychological impact airpower had. However, it should be noted that these issues were not issues with airpower itself but rather the improper use of airpower by those in command, notably concerning the accuracy of intelligence acted upon.
3.3 Afghanistan
The COIN operation that occurred within Afghanistan was influenced heavily by airpower, which served as a force multiplier in COIN operations, significantly enhancing the effectiveness of military engagements. First, precision strikes employed in Afghanistan gave the ISAF forces an increased strategic capability, which aided in disrupting insurgent activities while minimising collateral damage. Within Afghanistan, Operation Medusa of 2006 highlighted the benefit of precision strike capabilities, with strikes in the Panjai district helping degrade Taliban capabilities. The operation’s success can be seen in the change in operations and tactics of the Taliban as a result of the attack. The Taliban would only engage ISAF troops in two conventional battles after being so comprehensively defeated by the combined air and ground forces in Operation Medusa. Furthermore, the use of precision strikes to target insurgent leaders has provided an asset, such as the strike that killed Hakimullah Mehsud, the leader of the TTP. Such strikes have a considerable ability to destabilise command structures, with the aim of disruption and degradation often cited by the US. Indeed, a factional fight was triggered by the death of Hakimullah Mehsud in November 2013, with other members of the group being killed by infighting, including Asmatullah Shaheen. From this, the use of precision strikes within COIN can be demonstrated, as it enables commanders to support ground operations with CAS and disrupt the command structure of insurgent groups.
Secondly, the ability of troops to be deployed rapidly and flexibly provided by airpower was utilised heavily during COIN operations in Afghanistan, significantly increasing strategic mobility. The ability to deploy troops via airpower was crucial; indeed, during Operation Anaconda in March 2002 in the Shahi-Kot Valley in eastern Afghanistan, the only way to access it was via helicopters and aircraft transport. The ability to deploy troops via airpower and then support them with air-delivered firepower proved crucial, with the combination of air and ground forces and air-delivered firepower proving to be a combination necessary to winning the engagement. Poor weather did limit the deployment of US Army soldiers, with only 200 out of the 400 scheduled initially for insertion being able to deploy.. Furthermore, the mobility provided by airpower combines well with special forces operations, as highlighted by the 2011 Operation Neptune Spear. The importance of airpower in such operations is highly noted by Robinson, who suggests that US spending has increased from $2.3 billion in 2001 to $10.5 billion in 2012 so, had the spending on special forces equipment, culminating in the raid in May 2011 on Osama Bin Laden. The success of the operation and the level of investment spent on equipment necessary for rapid air mobility emphasise the importance placed on airpower by the US government, with specific regard to mobility. This capability allows for a highly flexible strike capability, which is vital when engaged in COIN operations.
Thirdly, the ISR enabled by airpower proved invaluable during COIN operations in Afghanistan. The use of persistent surveillance in Helmand from 2009-2010 was vital in gathering intelligence on Taliban movements, especially when attempting to identify those involved in IED creation and distribution. Indeed, the ability of drones to undertake constant surveillance allowed for continuous feedback on insurgent operations, allowing commanders to monitor insurgent commanders and strongholds as well as allowing for a better understanding of the operational environment. Furthermore, the initial success of Operation Enduring Freedom can be credited to the aerial surveillance provided by UAVs, as when combined with special operators on the ground, a wide-reaching and in-depth intelligence picture was created. This is evidenced by Blom, who states, “Despite flying an average of only 200 sorties a day, Air Force crews engaged as many targets each day as it had when flying 3,000 daily missions during DESERT STORM. Among the factors that led to this increased efficiency was using UAVs for target acquisition. Special Forces troops worked in conjunction with UAVs to monitor Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces and decrease the sensor-to-shooter loop.” Therefore, one can argue that airpower, and in particular the use of UAVs, played a crucial role in COIN operations conducted by ISAF forces within Afghanistan, aiding in achieving tactical victories on the battlefield. From this, one can deduce that the role of airpower within COIN operations in Afghanistan was considerable, with airpower providing crucial precision strikes, strategic reach, and ISR capabilities that would otherwise not be present, greatly aiding the tactical ability of ISAF forces.
Part II: Challenges and Criticisms of Airpower
4.1 Iraq
Despite several positive benefits of employing airpower in COIN, there are also a number of challenges which, left unchecked, can lead to airpower ultimately harming COIN operations rather than aiding in their completion. The influence of airpower in Iraq was far from entirely positive, with many challenges and criticisms arising. First, despite precision targeting, there remained a high number of civilian casualties and collateral damage as a result of airpower incidents, which ultimately served to undermine COIN efforts. First, and arguably most notable such action was the 2004 Fallujah assault, upon which airstrikes caused significant civilian casualties as well as considerable infrastructure damage. Indeed, approximately 800 civilians were killed during the fighting, with the use of overwhelming violence required to clear the insurgent forces leading to over 60% of the city being damaged with 20% of the buildings being destroyed outright. Furthermore, the 2015 Hawija Airstrike conducted by two Dutch F-16s targeting an ISIS gathering caused mass civilian casualties, which further increased negative feelings toward the coalition forces. This is further evidenced by Kanetake, who writes, “The US Civilian Casualty Assessment reported 70 civilian casualties. According to the report after the strike, the attack resulted in at least 85 civilian casualties and damaged 6,000 homes and 1,200 businesses and shops”. These examples demonstrate the risk of using airpower in COIN, especially when striking in urban environments, with an increased likelihood of collateral damage. Therefore, one can suggest that if measures are not taken to mitigate collateral damage further, airpowers impact can be harmful when trying to achieve strategic COIN objectives.
Secondly, the coalition forces deployed to Iraq became over-reliant on technological surveillance, with inadequate HUMINT hindering the coalition's understanding of local dynamics and combat areas. The failure to do this adequately was demonstrated by the 2006 Al-Askari Mosque Bombing, where the lack of effective HUMINT hindered efforts to prevent the bombing itself and subsequent attacks. The bombing had far-reaching consequences, as it was an attempt to start a sectarian war, as demonstrated in the quote by Al-Zarqawi: “If we succeed in dragging them into the arena of sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger.” The bombing also highlighted an over-reliance by coalition forces on ISR provided by airpower rather than other intelligence methods such as HUMINT or SIGINT. Furthermore, the 2008 Diyala Province Insurgency further underscored the importance of HUMINT, with an insufficient understanding of local dynamics significantly impacting the COIN efforts. Such failures meant that there were 40 mass casualty events in the DRV, as well as in Ba`quba, where 16 mass casualty attacks in 12 months occurred. These may have otherwise been preventable if greater emphasis had been placed on understanding the population’s sentiment, something which cannot be obtained from airpower alone. Therefore, one can argue that despite ISR capabilities provided by airpower, HUMINT and other intelligence methods remain crucial to a successful COIN strategy.
Thirdly, insurgent adaptability remained an ever-present issue, with the insurgent groups active within Iraq developing flexible strategies designed to blunt the effectiveness of airpower. During operations in Iraq, there was a noticeable shift in insurgent tactics, with a great emphasis being placed on asymmetric tactics such as IEDs and suicide bombings. These attacks are difficult to combat through the use of airpower alone, with kinetic action and ISR messages being the only options, which limit their ability to prevent such attacks. This difficulty in combating the asymmetric tactics is evidenced by the fact that as of 2007, “Improvised explosive devices, also known as IEDs, roadside bombs, and suicide car bombs, have caused over 70% of all American combat casualties in Iraq”. Furthermore, the ISIS insurgency in Iraq further illustrated the adaptability of insurgent forces, with ISIS forces often turning to using civilians as human shields to defeat coalition airpower, with OHCHR reporting that in 2016, 5,370 families were forced to be human shields in the Shura sub-district alone. Such measures are almost impossible to counter with airpower alone, as the techniques and machinery simply do not exist to combat such tactics. As a result, it can be suggested that insurgent forces can adapt to overwhelming airpower, adaptation which ultimately decides the power of the force wielding the overwhelming airpower. Therefore, it can be argued that during the COIN operation in Iraq, airpower was not without its challenges, with several civilian casualties being caused, an over-reliance on ISR from airpower and the inability to combat insurgent adaptability hurting the effectiveness of coalition airpower in COIN.
4.2 Libya
The COIN operations in Libya also highlighted many challenges and limitations of airpower when effectively battling an insurgent force, which must be considered and analysed. First airpower faces challenges when employed in urban areas, primarily due to the increased risk of collateral damage, which limits its effectiveness in densely populated areas. The 2014 Battle of Tripoli saw various factions engaged in vicious urban-warfare, which limited airpower’s effectiveness; indeed, the increased risk of collateral damage hampered its effective employment. The failure to properly control the use of airpower and, more specifically, limit civilian casualties is emphasised by Sarah Whitson, stating, “Commanders on both sides need to rein in their forces and end the cycle of abuses or risk being first in line for possible sanctions and international prosecution,” Referring to the then ongoing battle of Tripoli, which while not fought exclusively with airpower, did see airpower causing unnecessary collateral damage. Furthermore, the conflict in Sabah in 2017 highlighted the difficulty of targeting insurgent forces with precision when operating in a built-up urban environment. This failure to be able to appropriately target insurgent forces allowed the IS operating in the area to wreak havoc, attacking the electricity infrastructure between Judea and Sabha. These incidents highlight the difficulty airpower as a tool faces concerning successful operations of any kind, but especially concerning precision strikes in built-up environments, with any collateral damage caused serving only to aid insurgent forces and detract from COIN efforts.
Secondly, during COIN operations in Libya, an over-reliance on airpower developed, which hindered comprehensive COIN strategies, with a balanced approach to integrating military and diplomatic efforts neglected. Such an over-reliance can cause conflict, as evidenced by the relationship between the city of Zintan and the LNA, which depends on airstrikes without addressing core grievances, straining an already weakened relationship. Indeed, despite being a relatively well-equipped force operating within Libya, “They have had a tense relationship with Marshal Haftar since 2012, although formally part of the LNA.”, a relationship that happened because of an over-reliance on airstrikes. Furthermore, the GNA required for Turkish Air Support in 2020 prompted many to suggest an ever-growing reliance on external airpower. The use of external airpower has led to some accidental shooting down of drones, such as the LNA mistakenly shooting down a US drone in November 2019. Such instances are detrimental to a nation's international relations and serve no positive benefit concerning COIN efforts. An overreliance on airpower for support can lead to a failure to invest in other crucial military and diplomatic assets necessary to combat an insurgent force. Therefore, it can be suggested that a dependency on airpower, especially external airpower, can harm COIN efforts, especially at the strategic level.
Thirdly, logistical challenges plagued the COIN operations in Libya, particularly concerning airpower, with challenges such as maintenance and refuelling impacting the continuous application of airpower. Whilst not an issue exclusive to airpower, logistical challenges and the friction which come with them can harm COIN efforts, as shown by the US Air operation from Europe between 2011 and 2017. The stationing of US aircraft in bases across Europe brought logistical challenges and a significant expense. The US Air Force dedicated a lot of its effort to logistical and refuelling support, especially for the French operation, with the operations overarching goal being to prevent Gaddafi's army from bombing and attacking civilian populations. Whilst the logistical challenges were met, the LNA could not achieve such logistical success, with logistical and maintenance issues plaguing the LNA in their efforts to provide their forms of effective CAS. Not only this, but maintenance issues could have prevented the LAFL from assisting in Operation Mediterranean Storm, in which two tankers attempting to smuggle 1.2 million litres and 6 million litres of fuel, respectively, were intercepted. The immense operational expenses associated with airpower can prevent it from being utilised to its maximum potential, especially when, in Libya's case, the nation’s financial health is less than desirable. One can suggest that airpower as a tool can be highly expensive to operate and relies on an extensive infrastructure to support even small airborne operations, factors which can lead to airpower being employed incorrectly or, in some cases, not at all. Therefore, it can be argued that the combination of airpower’s limited effect in urban warfare, combined with the drawbacks associated with becoming over-reliant on foreign airpower and the logistical challenges related to maintaining a significant airpower presence, suggest that necessary measures must be taken on the strategic level to implement airpower successfully within COIN.
4.3 Afghanistan
While airpower provided crucial advantages in Afghanistan, challenges and limitations presented themselves, underscoring the necessity of a multi-dimensional approach that integrates ground efforts and considers broader strategic considerations. First, civilian casualties from airstrikes often lead to a negative public sentiment, which, in the long-term, is highly detrimental to the effectiveness of the COIN strategies employed. Such negative sentiment occurred as a result of the Kunduz Airstrike of 2015, in which a MSF hospital was hit by a coalition airstrike, which had a highly detrimental impact on COIN efforts as well as public opinion. The strike itself began between 2:00 a.m. and 2:08 a.m. whilst the hospital was fully operational, with the strike costing the lives of 22 people and injuring dozens more. The attack itself was made worse by the fact that the GPS coordinates matched the exact location of the hospital, degrading public opinion. Furthermore, a similar mass casualty event occurred at the Herat Wedding Party Airstrike, which underscored the ever-present issue of distinguishing between legitimate targets and non-combatants. The attack that killed 40 civilians also had a detrimental impact on the way the ISAF forces were viewed, with Page stating, “Drone strikes amplified accusations and narratives of US reluctance to face/communicate with locals, juxtaposed by a willingness to kill at a distance and desecrate bodies.” Both events highlight the significant issues of target acquisition when employing airpower, as incorrect targeting can have devastating impacts that are heavily detrimental to the long-term outcome of COIN operations.
Secondly, Afghanistan's diverse and challenging terrain posed operational limitations for airpower, necessitating alternative strategies and complementary ground efforts. The operations in Tora Bora in 2001 proved they were not able to conquer all terrain-based limitations. The complex topography limited the effectiveness of airpower around Tora Bora during the hunt for Osama Bin Laden which aided his escape, as “Bin Laden was already familiar with the area and knew the escape routes. The cave entrances were not visible from the air; pilots would have to guess where to drop mines.” Further operational limitations of airpower can be seen in the 2010 battle of Marjahj, where the need for precision and the high likelihood of causing collateral damage prevented ISAF forces from operating in their preferred manner, with an increased number of ground forces being employed. This sentiment is demonstrated in the quote, “Given the rapid pace in which the company manoeuvred through the town, and the likelihood of civilian casualties, more precise means were employed. Javelins, light anti-tank weapons, and M203 grenade launchers were preferred over mortars and airstrikes.”. As a result, it can be deduced that whilst airpower can be utilised, it is not without limitation, with adverse topography and operational limitations limiting the overall impact of airpower on COIN operation.
Thirdly, airpower in Afghanistan lacked the effectiveness to address the ideological motivations of insurgents, limiting its impact. One can first see evidence of this in the insurgency resurgence in Helmand between 2008 and 2010, with the revival of the Taliban in Helmand demonstrating the limitations of relying on kinetic air strikes. Despite the high number of airstrikes conducted by ISAF forces and the withdrawal of the Taliban from more densely-populated areas, there remained at Taliban presence in all of Helmand Provinces, with combat groups based out of the desert in areas such as Marjah, Nad-e Ali, Musa Qala, Garmser and Nahr-e Seraj. Furthermore, the existence of ISIS insurgents in Nangarhar Province from 2015 to 2019 indicated the resilience of insurgent groups and reinforced the inadequacy of purely military solutions. Johnson comments on the rise of the IS forces in Afghanistan in the quote, “At the group’s height from August to December 2015, IS-K fighters numbered from 3,750–4,000, with almost all of these cadres active in eastern Nangarhar province”. Not only this, but the existence of the IS in Afghanistan highlighted the failings of airpower kinetic action to suppress insurgent forces. Ultimately, within COIN operations, it is essential to maintain a comprehensive approach addressing socio-political and economic factors fueling the insurgency, with an over-reliance on airpower and kinetic measures leading to a failure to address the core drivers of insurgent forces. Therefore, it can be argued that during the coalition mission in Afghanistan, the use of airpower brought numerous challenges. The ever-present issue of civilian casualties remained, with the diverse Afghan terrain further limiting operations. In addition, the failure to address core insurgent drivers further limited the overall success of the COIN mission at the strategic level. However, the blame cannot be placed solely on the door of airpower.
Part III: Case-Specific Considerations and Lessons
5.1 Iraq
To understand whether airpower aids or undermines COIN efforts, one must look at case study specific examples of airpower employed in COIN. Case-specific considerations and lessons learned allow one to gain a greater understanding of the influence of airpower on the COIN operations within Iraq. First, within Iraq, coalition forces often found themselves clearing reinforced insurgent strongholds, which required a combination of airpower and ground assets to neutralise, necessitating successful collaboration. The 2007 Surge, specifically in Anbar province, is an example of how such a combination of air support and ground forces composed of US personnel and local tribes worked effectively to neutralise insurgent positions. The operations in Anbar were characterised by air-operations, highlighted by the quote, “The operation kicked off on November 15, 2007, with the 3-101 joining with air assets to conduct an air assault into the Sunni villages of West and al-Betra, both of which were AQI sanctuaries that were home to al-Qaeda VBIED factories.” This demonstrates the successful implementation of airpower in clearing insurgent strongholds, an exercise repeated in 2018 with the Hawija offensive During the Hawija offensive against ISIS positions, where airpower was utilised to soften defensive positions as well as allow coalition partners to aid Iraqi forces without a mass deployment of troops. The Netherlands, UK, France, Belgium, Denmark, Australia, and the US all partook in the operation primarily through precision strikes. In total, OIR engaged in over 34,000 strikes and dropped over 100,000 bombs across Syria and Iraq against ISIS forces. Airpower was utilised successfully in these operations in a kinetic capacity to weaken, disrupt, and destroy insurgent positions, aiding COIN operations.
Secondly, Iraq highlighted the necessity of military action being partnered with political solutions, seeking to address the grievances of the population. Sectarian tensions often found themselves coming to the forefront, issues not aided by the lack of a comprehensive political resolution being developed for Iraq. The absence of a stable political framework allowed for the ideas of disruption and sectarian tension to be spread by insurgent forces. This is an idea commented on by Carl in the quote, “The US insisted on the complete "de-Baathification" of Iraq's government and military… Together, these factors made Sunnis fear that they were losing their superior cultural and political position, leading to the cycle of mutually antagonistic sectarianism and violence that peaked in the 2006-7 civil war.” The lack of an adequate plan to support the military efforts can be further evidenced by the protests that occurred in 2019 and 2020, which manifested due to an unsolved political landscape, showcasing their requirement for military and political success. In 2019, state security forces reacted poorly when confronted by the protests, ultimately leading to the deaths of 600 protestors and injuring a further 20,000, with the then Prime minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi being forced to resign. These events show that despite airpower being a useful military tool, no amount of military success can defeat an insurgency and provide stability if the proper political and sociological investments are not made.
Lastly, the COIN operation in Iraq highlighted the need for a holistic COIN strategy requiring the integration of airpower with diplomatic, intelligence, and nation-building development efforts. Whilst no COIN effort is the same, an underlying holistic approach is necessary to achieving success, something attempted by the coalition forces in Iraq with Operation New Dawn in 2009, with the period highlighting the importance of integrating airpower with diplomatic, intelligence and developmental efforts. This operation sought to bring stability and a holistic approach to the otherwise primarily military COIN effort seen in Iraq, culminating in President Obama announcing on August 31 that the American combat mission in Iraq had ended. Further to this, “US troops remained in Iraq with a different mission: advising and assisting Iraq’s security forces, supporting Iraqi troops in targeted counter-terrorism missions, and protecting US civilians” a capacity in which it was hoped a more holistic approach could be taken. Further evidence of a holistic approach being required can be seen in the Liberation of Mosul in 2017, where the integration not only between airpower and ground forces in the form of Operation Eagle Strike, which faced myriad challenges, especially the continuous monitoring and preparation required, But also effort is needed in the subsequent stabilisation efforts with an emphasis on governance, reconstruction and addressing sectarian tensions emphasising the complex nature of COIN. It can be suggested that integrating airpower with diplomatic, intelligence and development efforts is crucial for long-term COIN success. Therefore, one can begin to understand that despite airpower playing an essential military role in COIN, such as clearing strongholds and aiding on the tactical level, the underlying issues of defeating an insurgency rely on a far wider-reaching integrated approach as well as a focus on achieving a political resolution.
5.2 Libya
The use of airpower in Libya had ramifications that extended beyond the tactical, political, and diplomatic ramifications, playing an undeniable role in the outcome of the COIN operation. First, the use of airpower in COIN operations has the potential to impact international perception and legitimacy, with careful consideration of legal and ethical aspects being required. Within Libya itself, this was evident by the 2011 NATO intervention as a whole, with the intervention facing international scrutiny, with many questioning the legitimacy of the air campaign and the legality of the intervention. This scrutiny was particularly levelled towards airpower in the primarily airpower-focused intervention, an idea evidenced by Mueller stating, “the Air Force’s role in such conflicts may be shaped as much by domestic political considerations as by its demonstrated ability to exert strategic influence at minimum cost and risk.” This emphasises the utility of airpower as a method of exerting strategic influence and its possible misuse if policymakers choose to deploy the aforementioned strategic influence poorly. Furthermore, foreign involvement in the Libyan conflict in 2020 caused more internal debate, with further concerns regarding the legitimacy of the COIN efforts in 2020. The failure to provide an adequate solution not involving purely military action is highlighted by Iranti writing, “For years, US diplomats and officials have emphasised the importance of a political solution, but US actions have yet to convince or compel Libyans and their various patrons to disengage from confrontation”. Ultimately these events highlight that despite the strategic capability of airpower, it cannot replace political efforts and understanding, something necessary when seeking to resolve an insurgent threat.
Secondly, airpower’s kinetic strikes must balance achieving military objectives and humanitarian concerns to maintain positive civilian perception and support. The 2019 Tripoli airstrikes serve as an example of such, with the incident highlighting the delicate balance required when conducting airstrikes to not alienate the local population, emphasising the importance of minimising civilian casualties. The airstrikes themselves hit the Tajoura Detention Centre, which contained 616 migrants; 53 were killed, including six children. This event brought much condemnation and highlighted a key drawback of airpower, that being the high level of risk which comes with kinetic strikes, especially near areas where civilians are massing. Furthermore, the Benghazi Liberation of 2017 saw airstrikes aimed at dislodging the extremist groups within the city, and whilst the liberation was a success, there were mass civilian casualties which hindered the overarching COIN efforts. In total, “Since 2012, the LNA has reportedly conducted at least 2,348 airstrikes, killing between 214 and 356 civilians. The GNA strike count is nowhere near that of the LNA, even with international intervention. The GNA’s 453 strikes have killed between 53 and 72 civilians.” The high number of civilian casualties greatly discredits any COIN efforts, especially in the eyes of human rights organisations and the civilians themselves. Therefore, one can argue that it is imperative to combine airpower with adequate intelligence and the highest level of mitigation available to minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage at risk of harming overarching COIN efforts.
Finally, a desire to achieve diplomatic solutions and conflict resolutions can necessitate carefully integrating airpower actions with broader political and diplomatic initiatives to prevent one from undermining the other. The negotiations in Libya were incredibly delicate, as highlighted in the quote, “In this delicate phase, the rising role of the municipalities became relevant, especially when Misrata decided to send their representatives to Geneva. The most powerful militia in Libya, due to its role in the revolution that toppled Qaddhafi, the Misrata Municipal Council distanced itself from the GNC by supporting the negotiations” Furthermore, the Berlin conference of 2020 sought to finally address the Libyan conflict by emphasising the need for a diplomatic solution, with the use of airpower by various factions becoming a key point of discussion to allow for an end of resolution being military intervention. There was a call for the dismantling of armed groups and militias, with the aim of a final “comprehensive and lasting cessation of all hostilities, including air operations over the territory of Libya. We call for the redeployment of heavy weapons, artillery and aerial vehicles and their cantonment.” These negotiations emphasise the difficulty of seeking a diplomatic solution, especially when active hostilities are ongoing, emphasising the need for carefully integrating airpower actions with more wide-reaching political and diplomatic initiatives. Therefore, one can suggest that the use of airpower highlights the issues involved when engaged in a conflict garnering much international condemnation, a conflict not aided by many operations in urban areas limiting airpower’s effectiveness and occurring whilst sporadic diplomatic negotiations are taking place.
5.3 Afghanistan
Finally, successful COIN operations hinge on diverse agencies’ seamless integration and collaboration. The synergy between these components is essential for a comprehensive strategy, adapting to the evolving nature of insurgent threats. First, Afghanistan highlighted the requirement for close collaboration between different agencies, with airpower being a small component of a much larger COIN effort. Within Afghanistan, the CJTF exemplifies this, with the task force comprising military, diplomatic, and humanitarian components to address regional instability and aid in successfully completing the COIN mission. This contradicted the previous method of command whereby “The most senior US military leaders were in Bagram, physically and perhaps psychologically separated from Afghan political and international diplomatic efforts in Kabul.” The creation of the CJTF allowed for a greater knitting together of military and political work, allowing for CJTF to focus on warfighting and stability operations. This level of integration is necessary in COIN for the interlinking of the military and political efforts involved in COIN, with airpower being an additional arm of military power. Further, PRTS in Afghanistan sought to increase collaboration between military, civilian, and diplomatic entities to facilitate reconstruction and stability. PRTS themselves combined diplomatic, military and development components and sought to “‘improve stability by building up the capacity of the host nation to govern; enhance economic viability; and deliver essential public services such as security, law and order, justice, health care, and education” CJTF and PRTS serve as examples of the efforts taken within Afghanistan to combine the tactical and strategic military operations with rebuilding operations necessary to a longer-term successful COIN operation, with airpower playing a role in facilitating both operations.
Secondly, reducing friction and increasing efficient logistical support is crucial to continuing sustained air operations, especially in remote areas during COIN efforts. As mentioned previously in this essay, the unique geography of Afghanistan proved difficult for the ISAF forces to overcome, with this extending to the issues of resupplying remote bases, often with air supply being the only viable method. Betson highlights the challenges of operating within Afghanistan: “However, the altitudes in the country stretch the capabilities of rotary wing assets. (The UH-60 Blackhawk and CH-47 Chinook have published 6,500 feet and 20,000 feet service ceilings respectively.) Ground forces relied on US Air Force fixed-wing assets on many occasions, even though, as the commander of the US Transportation Command testified to Congress in 2010, "it costs ten times as much per pound to transport something by air than by land or sea.” This highlights both the utility of airpower and the limitations associated when forced to rely on airpower, especially concerning transport. Further, the Manas transit centre serves as an example of the mass logical efforts involved, with the success of this centre highlighting the importance of establishing efficient logistical networks to sustain air operations. Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan featured a 13,800-foot-long runway and would serve as a crucial base, especially for the initial invasion of Afghanistan, with the 86th CRG based at Ramstein Air Base deploying to make sure the air base was operational. The aforementioned examples serve to highlight both the benefits of being able to deploy airpower, as it provides a level of flexibility not otherwise available when engaged in COIN, while also serving to demonstrate why successful airpower operation can be extremely costly and requires a high level of manpower to remain fully operational.
Finally, COIN operations require and demand adaptability and innovation, with the integration of new technologies proving crucial. The integration of cyber capabilities alongside airpower in ongoing operations serves to highlight the need for innovative strategies, with information warfare becoming a crucial battlespace, especially with the broader distribution of modern internet-capable technology across the globe. Integrating cyber effects in COIN was done during Afghanistan, as highlighted by Withers, who states, “Cyber effects have reportedly been employed in COIN in Afghanistan, with one US General claiming that: “I was able to use my cyber operations against my adversary with great impact... I was able to get inside his nets, infect his command-and-control, and defend myself against his almost constant incursions to get inside my wire, to affect my operations.” The employment of airpower alongside cyber technologies can allow for a more complete approach to COIN, as demonstrated by the use of an adversary command and control network. Furthermore, the use of Artificial Intelligence in surveillance has the potential to impact airpower within COIN, improving the effectiveness of intelligence gathering. This idea was explored within the COIN operations of Afghanistan, with an OTH-CT strategy for Afghanistan being to consider how RPAs could address intelligence and strike capacity gaps in aid of ground forces.. These are examples of where airpower and innovation must work in unison to provide the best COIN effort. Ultimately, the COIN efforts in Afghanistan demonstrate a level of learning from those involved from the early insurgencies of Iraq, with the idea of collaboration being pushed, an idea necessary for holistic success, as well as an emphasis being placed on adaptability and innovation. Whilst within Afghanistan, airpower aided in overcoming some of the logistical challenges of Afghanistan while creating new supply chain issues, which, whilst not responsible for the failure of COIN in Afghanistan, did not aid in the reduction of expenditure in the nation.
Conclusion
To conclude, this paper has demonstrated both the positive impacts of airpower in the 21st century in COIN operations and examined existing challenges and case study specific examples of the deployment of airpower in COIN. The positive strategic and tactical use of airpower in COIN is evident throughout the conflicts of the 21st century. The precision strike capability offered by airpower serves as just one example, with the ability to carry out precision strikes providing commander's unparalleled capacity to carry out tactical strikes. Furthermore, the ISR aspect of airpower cannot be underplayed, as while kinetic force can be a valuable option to commanders, the gathering of information and monitoring of suspected insurgents is vital to the long-term successful employment of a COIN campaign, especially in scenarios where distinguishing between friend or foe is highly challenging. Lastly, within the case studies examined in this paper, the theme of airpower providing flexibility is apparent, whether tactically or more strategically. The ability to deploy and project force rapidly is a crucial one in the modern battlefield, primarily when employed against an asymmetric opposing force as was the case in Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan.
However, it would be wrong to suggest that airpower is the golden bullet from which all COIN issues can be solved. The objective failure of the COIN operations in Afghanistan demonstrates as much. While developments to mitigate against the downfalls of airpower are ongoing, the reality of civilian casualties is never far from conversations surrounding airpower. The high number of civilian casualties seen in the three case study operations demonstrates one of the key criticisms of airpower, that whilst it may be an aid to a military command in a tactical situation, over an extended period, the use of tactical air strikes serves only to diminish long-term COIN operations. The inability to guarantee minimal civilian casualties limits the overall effectiveness of airpower in COIN, as gaining a civilian population's support must remain of utmost priority, as losing the population’s support significantly diminishes the likelihood of COIN success. Furthermore, the realities of urban combat against an asymmetric insurgent force further limit the extent to which airpower is constructive, as any resulting action is likely to cause not only civilian casualties but also mass destruction to civil infrastructure. This can lead to a further depiction of airpower as an imprecise faceless weapon of destruction, an idea which an asymmetric insurgent force can utilise for propaganda purposes.
Ultimately, airpower in an age of COIN is uniquely positioned, as it can be an overwhelmingly beneficial military asset for tactical use while proving to be a longer-term strategic liability. The traditional strengths of airpower, such as the ability to provide an overwhelming amount of force to a strategic target at a moment's notice, are not best suited for COIN warfare. The asymmetric nature of many insurgent groups serves only to highlight one of the significant flaws of airpower in COIN, with incorrect targeting and collateral damage proving detrimental to a hearts and minds campaign and decreasing political support for ongoing operations. However, using airpower is not without its benefits, with it providing advantages to a military campaign that would otherwise not be possible. The use of airpower to force an enemy to change their battlefield tactics, as in Afghanistan 2001, cannot be understated. Furthermore, the ISR capabilities of airpower allow personnel deployed to better understand the battlespace, enhancing their combat effectiveness. The non-linear nature of COIN battlefields further indicates the utility of airpower as often ground forces are reliant solely on airpower for fire support. Therefore, it can be argued that airpower is an asset that can fall victim to being employed incorrectly or in such a way that it is detrimental to the long-term success of a COIN mission. However, despite this, airpower is an asset that cannot be ignored, serving as a crucial force enabler and providing support and assistance no other assets can provide. Airpower is an asset which, whilst not the ‘golden bullet’, is very much necessary for nations seeking to conduct COIN operations in future, tactically enabling ground forces and providing flexibility, ISR capability and mobility that no other asset could provide when employed correctly.
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