To what extent, do you think, the Western society and military seek to minimise enemy civilian casualties in their conflicts?
Western Societies and militaries have engaged in a number of conflicts in the past 25 years, which demonstrate a level of commitment to the minimisation of civilian casualties, however, this is not to say that more cannot be done. One must first understand Western views toward civilian casualties to understand Western societies and military ideas on civilian casualties. Ralph Peters suggested that “American citizenry will tolerate the killing of enormous numbers of foreigners, so long as that killing does not take too long, victory is clear-cut, friendly casualties are comparatively low, and the enemy dead do not have names, faces, and families.”, a view which, while partially accurate, does not stand up to modern scrutiny; indeed, the past 25 years have highlighted as much. The advent of the information age and increased consumption of visual media have brought the realities of conflict home to Western nations’ peoples. Furthermore, the counter-insurgency (COIN) nature of conflicts in which Western nations have been engaged in during the past 25 years has made minimising civilian casualties not only a societal demand aimed at minimising the civilian cost of war but also a beneficial military strategic endeavour to pursue. Indeed, by examining conflicts Western nations have engaged in for the past 25 years, one can begin to understand the Western approaches to minimising civilian casualties. First, one just looks at Western societal attitudes, then the military strategies and practices of Western militaries concerning minimising enemy civilian casualties must be examined before finally analysing and understanding the challenges that exist with regard to civilian casualty minimisation and areas for improvement which remain for Western forces. Western nations, both militarily and in society, emphasise the preservation of life, with moral and ethical imperatives driving Western nations to continue to pursue the minimisation of civilian casualties in war. Furthermore, within this essay, the primary focus will be the past 25 years, as, through this period, a clear change in society and military views toward civilian casualties is demonstrated, with COIN requirements for the military and greater viability of information for societies intersecting creating an environment which prioritises the minimisation of civil casualties. Therefore, one can argue that while civilian casualties continue to occur in conflicts where Western nations are involved, it is not through a lack of trying, with Western militaries placing a great emphasis on the preservation of civilian life in conflict, as demonstrated by the past 25 years of investment in training and technology demonstrating a clear shift in thinking from wars of a previous era.
Firstly, when looking at Western societies and militaries seeking to minimise enemy civilian casualties, it is necessary to look at Western social attitudes with regard to minimising enemy civilian casualties. First, ethical imperatives must be considered, with both international humanitarian law (IHL) and public opinion, as well as morality, playing an influential role in how civilian casualties are viewed. IHL dictates the actions of Western nations in the 21st century concerning civilian casualties, primarily in the form of the Geneva Conventions. The ‘Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War’ signed on August 12th 1949, seeks through 159 Articles to outline the treatment of both armed and unarmed peoples, an example being Article 4, stating “Persons taking no active part in the hostilities... shall in all circumstances be treated humanely”. The signing and ratification of the four 1949 conventions meant an increased emphasis on protecting civilian life from Western nations such as the US and UK. This can be demonstrated by Operation Allied Force of 1999 in Kosovo, where NATO airstrikes aimed to protect civilian life while targeting specific military targets demonstrated an adherence to IHL. Furthermore, public opinion has influenced Western militaries concerning civilian casualties, as shown clearly by the Western military's reaction to civilian casualties in the Afghanistan War. Indeed, in 2006, as a result of OEF and ISAF airstrikes, there were 116 Afghan civilians killed, which increased threefold in 2007 to 321. This caused an increase in scrutiny from the general public as well as organisations such as Human Rights Watch. This, in turn, led to a higher level of care to avoid civilian casualties from ISAF and OEF forces, leading to a reduction in civilian casualties in 2008 of 119. Whilst this demonstrated that civilian casualties were still occurring, the reduction in civilian casualties serves as evidence to suggest that an increased emphasis was being placed on preserving the lives of civilians rather than solely pursuing a military victory without regard for collateral damage. Therefore, it can be suggested that whilst civilian casualties remained ever present, as a result of IHL and scrutiny, Western militaries seek to minimise the number of civilian casualties.
Secondly, strategic considerations such as a ‘hearts and minds approach’ as well as legal and political ramifications of actions influence Western military thinking and actions. The Global War on Terror saw Western forces engaged primarily in COIN operations which led to an increase in the energy and time expended on aiding the local populus to win over support. One way in which this could be achieved was through attempting to minimise civilian harm, with it being recognised as high in importance to maximising COIN success. The effects of civilian casualties on COIN are evidenced by Vavrichek, who states, “The effect of insurgent math can be magnified in the case of civilian casualties. Overall, civilian casualties from these operations may create grievances that radicalise populations, increase support for terrorist elements, and degrade the political will of the United States and partner nations for actions.”. This serves as evidence to suggest that from a strategic perspective when engaged in COIN, the reduction of civilian casualties was beneficial as it reduces friction between forces such as ISAF in Afghanistan and the local population. Furthermore, possible legal and political ramifications from bodies such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and United Nations Security Council Resolution incentivise Western militaries to minimise civilian harm. Furthermore, studies conducted by Boettcher highlight that the number of civilians under threat in a humanitarian crisis did impact the willingness to intervene militarily, demonstrating a concern for celiacs from the voting population of Western states. The aforementioned reasons both serve as incentives for Western forces to minimise collateral damage, predominantly civilian casualties. Therefore, it can be suggested that Western strategic considerations and possibly legal and potential ramifications both serve to incentivise a minimisation of civilian casualties, primarily when engaged in COIN.
Lastly, technological advancements and the adaptation of tactics in the form of precision targeting and civilian protection measures, respectively, highlight Western efforts to minimise civilian casualties. First, the advent of precision targeting and increased intelligence gathering by the Western military sought to reduce civilian casualties whilst increasing tactical effectiveness. This can be evidenced by the use of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and other Precision Guided Munitions (PGMS) by Western militaries and the subsequent effect on civilian casualties. Indeed, “85,000 Iraqi civilians died as a result of the war up through 2008. Of these, about 9,500 were the result of air strikes—11.3 percent of the total. Significantly, but the percentage of deaths attributable to air attacks also decreased—to 2.6 percent (after 2005). In other words, more than 97 percent of the estimated 60,922 Iraqi civilians killed after 2005 were the victims of ground warfare.” As well as PGMs reducing civilian casualties, technological advancements in intelligence-gathering machinery such as Space-Based cameras and radar have allowed Western military planners a greater ability to reduce civilian casualties by increasing the targeting of bombing missions, although it should be noted that errors do continue to occur. Furthermore, Civilian protection measures such as no-fly zones and Civilian Casualty Mitigation Teams (CCMTs) aid in the protection of civilians. The use of no-fly zones in Bosnia and Iraq was implemented to protect civilian populations from aerial attacks, demonstrating a precise proactive measure to minimise harm. As well as this, the creation of CCMTs in Afghanistan as a result of civilian casualties resulted in bolstering relationships with groups outside of ISAF, allowing for the cross-checking of data and the diffusion and classification of allegations related to civilian casualties. These dedicated units, whose focus was assessing and minimising civilian harm during military operations, demonstrate a commitment to protecting non-combatants. Therefore, it can be argued that modern technology paired with civilian protection measures in the form of no-fly zones and CCMTs demonstrate Western military attempts to increase their tactical effectiveness while seeking to minimise civilian casualties and take preemptive measures to protect civilians.
Secondly, to evaluate whether Western societies and militaries seek to minimise enemy civilian casualties, one must look at military strategies and practices in recent conflicts. First, Western Rules of Engagement (ROE), particularly regarding restricting the use of force and the use of training and education, demonstrate an emphasis being placed on the preservation of civilian lives. This can be seen first in the ROE used by Western forces, especially when engaged in COIN missions during the Iraq and Afghanistan. One example of this can be seen in 2010 when, on the 4th of August, General Petraeus issued an updated tactical directive to all ISAF forces. The directive itself emphasises a disciplined use of force as well as stating, “We must balance our pursuit of the enemy with our efforts to minimise loss of innocent civilian life”. This reinforcement of Western ROE, with a priority being placed upon the preservation of civilian life, indicates the importance placed upon minimising civilian casualties, especially when operating in a COIN capacity within Afghanistan. Furthermore, when engaged in Iraq in 2007, the US military prioritised protecting civilians through stricter ROE. US military Doctrine and training have developed in the past 50 years with a great emphasis being placed on the protection of civilian life. This is exemplified by the 1974 US Law of War Program which aimed to broaden the US military's moral commitment and legal constraint. The influence of the program on training US forces can be seen in the quote, “Soldiers and Marines involved in combat specialities receive more detailed Law of War training…The services and global combatant commands also integrate Law of War principles into their regular training exercises at all levels.” As well as this, the Law of War program also required legal advisers to aid military commanders in “reviewing operational plans, policies, directives, ROE, and procurements for compliance with the Law of War, and investigate and prosecute potential war crimes.”. From this, one can deduce that the US and Western allies seek to minimise civilian casualties through the increased tightening of ROE as well as an increased emphasis on the training of soldiers and officers, with a greater emphasis placed on the minimisation of collateral damage.
Furthermore, Civil-Military cooperation in the form of engagement with the civilian population, as well as coordination with Humanitarian Organisations, exemplify a shift in military strategies to aid civilian populations. This can be seen first by the use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) beginning in Afghanistan in November 2002 and then in Iraq in 2005 by Coalition forces. Indeed, the PRT handbook states, “PRT is designed to help improve stability by building up the capacity of local governments to govern; enhance economic viability; and deliver public services such as security, law and order, justice, health care, and education”. These PRTs exemplify how military efforts can produce aid to and support the civilian populace, demonstrating a commitment to aiming to minimise harm and foster goodwill among the population. Furthermore, coordinating with Humanitarian Organisations from Western militaries further demonstrates Western strategies targeted at minimising civilian casualties. This is evidenced by the establishment of the Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence (CIMIC COE) in 2001 as a part of the NATO Centres of Excellence program, which serves to advance collaboration between military and humanitarian organisations to mitigate civilian harm during conflict. The effect of CIMIC COE became evident within Afghanistan, with “all efforts taken to avoid, minimise and mitigate the negative effects that might arise from NATO and NATO-led military operations on the civilian population”. The use of CIMIC COE in Afghanistan aided in the protection of civilians from Western militaries, with a priority being placed on the preservation of civilian life by ISAF. Therefore, it can be argued that Civil-Military cooperation, as well as coordination with Humanitarian Organisations, demonstrates the clear focus placed on the protection and minimisation of harm toward civilians by Western military forces.
Lastly, within Western militaries, increased accountability measures have been put in place, as well as increased reconstruction and compensation efforts, tasked with minimising and then limiting the damage caused by Western militaries. First, Joint Incident Assessment Teams (JIATs) were created to investigate civilian casualties which resulted from military operations to hold those accountable for wrongful harm. In 2009, Maj. Gen. Davis stated the teams founded by ISAF were to “[determine] the facts, regardless of what that might mean, to recommend actions to be taken to avoid casualties in future and to recommend changes in techniques or procedures that might be relevant across the force”. The teams served to provide accountability, which was missing before their establishment, to allow civilians to feel as though justice would be served in the case of any wrongdoing. Further to this Civilian Casualty Tracking Cells (CCTCs) were created to allow for the monitoring of and creation of competition mechanisms set up to address civilian harm inflicted by Western forces and provide assistance to the affected individuals. The program impact is clearly visible within Afghanistan in 2009 where, shortly after the creation of CCTCs and after the collection of data for several months, trends began to emerge, demonstrated in the quote, “when data began to show that Afghan civilians were being killed in numerous traffic accidents caused by ISAF forces/drivers, the SAF Commander issued a directive on driving (30 August 2009) which instructed soldiers to avoid aggressive driving and to instead emphasise safe driving, ISAF Commander issued a directive on driving (30 August 2009)”. This demonstrates the investment taken by Western militaries to preserve and protect civilian life. Indeed, this is further evidenced by the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which was created in 2002 to provide an international development fund for the people of Afghanistan, aiming to help address the impacts of conflict on civilian populations. Therefore, one can argue that the use of JIATs, CCTCs and ARFTs serve as examples of Western militaries and societies aiming to minimise civilian casualties and aid in the minimisation of civilian damages inflicted as a result of Western military action.
Thirdly, despite Western militaries and societies seeking to minimise civilian casualties, they are not entirely successful in this task, with challenges and areas for improvement remaining. First, despite advancements, technological limitations and risks remain, with civilian harm being inflicted by precision strikes despite efforts being taken to minimise collateral damage. It was hoped that the creation of PGM would aid in minimising the number of civilian casualties, and whilst they have undoubtedly helped in this matter, they have not removed the chance of civilian casualties. This is evidenced in the quote, “from 2009 through September 2020, the UNAMA counted 2,588 civilians who were injured in pro-government force airstrikes. According to UNAMA data, more than 3,340 civilians were killed in airstrikes in Afghanistan between 2009 and the first nine months of 2020.”This highlights that despite the use of PGM, such as JDAMs, the nature of COIN and targeting intelligence errors led to a high number of civilian casualties. Further evidence of precision munitions still leading to civilian casualties would be the 17th March 2017 Mosul Airstrike. The strike conducted by the US employed a single GBU-38 PGM targeting two ISIS snipers; however, despite the bomb accrual targeting the ISIS position, a second explosion was triggered, which killed 101 civilians sheltered in the bottom floors. This incident was one of the deadliest attacks to have occurred since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, with an investigation being launched shortly after the incident. The attack highlights the limitation of technology, scarily with regard to PGMs and Intelligence-gathering machinery, as despite the target itself being accurately hit, there was a lack of intelligence regarding civilians sheltering within the building. Therefore, it can be suggested that while Western militaries seek to avoid civilian casualties, there is a limitation to the capacity to which they can achieve this, with a lack of intelligence and technological shortcomings creating scenarios where civilian casualties can be high.
Furthermore, modern conflicts for Western nations have centred around urban and asymmetric warfare, both of which provide unique challenges which hamper their efforts to minimise civilian casualties. First, in urban warfare cases, distinguishing between civilians and insurgent forces is often difficult, making accurate target acquisition difficult. This can be seen in the second battle for Fallujah. The battle itself, which lasted from 7th November to 23rd December 2004, saw coalition forces attempt to dislodge a well-dug-in and disguised Insurgent forces. During the fighting, the Iraq Body Count project estimated that between 572-616 civilians would die as a result of Western military action. The high number of civilians killed during the Second Battle of Fallujah was partly due to the urban setting in which the battle took place. Indeed, “Similar to other urban battles, due to the overwhelming violence required to safely clear the city, over 60 percent of Fallujah’s buildings were damaged and 20 percent destroyed outright.” Furthermore, the asymmetric warfare dynamics further increased the number of civilian casualties as a result of Western military action, as can be seen by Taliban tactics in Afghanistan. One example would be the 15th of August 2010, where “Two insurgents posed as civilian casualties and presented themselves to Afghan and coalition forces in Badghis province following an engagement where insurgents had attacked the partnered government force”. This is but one example, but it highlights the difficulty Western forces face when engaging in asymmetric warfare, usually when the local population’s feeling toward coalition forces is unknown. The blurred lines between combatants and noncombatants can lead to situations where civilians are mistaken as insurgent forces disguising themselves as civilians. Therefore, it could be suggested that Western forces could have employed more careful target assessment before engaging, as a number of civilians were killed within Afghanistan as a result of being mistaken for insurgent forces.
Finally, the political will and priorities of Western nations, as well as resource constraints, influence the degree to which civilian casualties can be minimised and aid distributed to those who have fallen victim to Western actions. Western societies can downplay the severity of incidents and the level of civilian suffering endured when it is broadly politically supported. An example of where Western nations have lessened their level of condemnation toward civilian casualties would be in the Yemen Civil War, where allegations of Western complicity in civilian harm due to their support for Saudi-led coalition forces engaged in Yemen. This can be evidenced by the number of civilians killed as a result of Saudi Arabian air strikes within Yemen since the conflict began, with 8,939 civilians estimated to have been killed and a further 10,243 injured as a result of airstrikes alone. The majority of these casualties are a result of Saudi airstrikes, which, whilst receiving condemnation from Western nations, have not received the same level of criticism as other actions as the Saudi Arabian coalition is supported by Western nations such as the US and UK. Furthermore, not only do political parties of Western nations influence the level of effort employed to protect civilians, but resource constraints and financial privatisation also influence the level of aid civilians receive. This can be evidenced clearly by the United States, and its level of spending in 2019. In 2019, the US spent $39.2 billion on foreign assistance and aid, less than 1% of the federal budget. In the same year, the US spent $686.1 billion on the defence budget, with the foreign aid expenditure representing 5.71% of the US defence budget. This demonstrates how competing demands for limited funding can constrain the level of support able to be offered with humanitarian assistance and civilian protection efforts often falling foul to other priorities, with public support often against increased spending on foreign aid. Therefore, it can be suggested that the political priorities of Western societies and militaries, as well as limited budget allocation for civilian protection measures, highlight that Western nations could do more to protect and aid civilian casualties.
In conclusion, Western societies and militaries demonstrate clear commitments to minimising enemy civilian casualties when engaged in conflicts. However, Western nations could employ far more measures to protect enemy civilians from becoming casualties. Western social attitudes toward civilian casualties differ from those of decades prior, with greater media exposure making Western societies far more aware of the destruction modern combat creates and the human cost on civilians as a result. Indeed, the past 25 years have highlighted an increased effort from Western militaries to minimise the level of civilian casualties, an effort demonstrated by the actions of Western militaries in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. The increased use of PGM and other available technology to assist with the prosecution of targets accurately while minimising civilian casualties demonstrates a clear shift from the indecisive use of air power seen in conflicts such as Vietnam. Furthermore, the changing of ROE and the establishment of groups such as JIATs, PRTs and CIMIC-COE demonstrate an effort to both reduce the likelihood of and then correctly assess and analyse any civilian casualties inflicted as a result of Western military actions. Finally, the creation of ARTFs and CCTC groups demonstrates an effort to not only monitor incidents of civilian casualties but also provide aid and compensation after an attack. However, despite these measures taken by Western forces, they are not faultless in their prosecution of minimising civilian casualties, with intelligence errors, urban warfare, asymmetric enemy forces and incorrect target assessment leading to higher civilian casualties. As well as this political motivations and financial limitations concerning humanitarian efforts limit the aid available to civilian casualties. Ultimately, Western societies and military seek, for the most part, to minimise civilian casualties in their conflicts, especially when engaged in COIN operations where the importance of gaining the trust and support of the local civil population is paramount, a far cry from the indiscriminate bombing seen in wars such as WW2 and Vietnam. However, Western societies and the military are not faultless, especially when engaged in scenarios where an operation's success is paramount or when criticising other nations’ bombing of civilians may work against a nation's broader political goals. Therefore, it can be argued that Western militaries and societies seek, for the most part, to minimise civilian casualties, as evidenced by the measures taken in the past 25 years to limit civilian casualties, however, more could still be done with regard to improving targeting, providing humanitarian aid and more comprehensive condemnation of detrimental actions.
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