Applying Faulty risk perception to the Christchurch Mosque shootings of the 15th of March 2019 Intelligence failure
1. Intro
The Christchurch mosque shootings in 2019 are one of the largest terrorist attacks in New Zealand’s history. The shootings certainly served as a reminder of a stark lapse in intelligence capabilities and its agencies, who failed to identify the risk posed by the far-right shooter. This essay aims to discuss the Cognitive bias that led to such a significant intelligence failure, mainly faulty risk perception and base rate neglect, and how these apply to the case study. Furthermore, it will discuss the significance and usefulness of applying the case to this factor, mainly that it highlights the need for a more comprehensive approach to threat assessment, particularly as new emerging extremist ideologies are becoming more taxing on intelligence services. We will also discuss other factors that could be used to apply to this case, such as confirmation bias, anchoring bias, groupthink and misapplication of past experience, and finally, what mitigations could be put in place to prevent further intelligence failures and help promote critical thinking.
The Christchurch mosque shootings occurred on March 15th 2019, and saw a white supremacist target two separate mosques. The attack killed 51 people and injured dozens more, making it the deadliest mass shooting in New Zealand’s history. The main issue that arose around the shootings was that the NZSIS, New Zealand’s intelligence services, had little information on the perpetrator and was considered a massive intelligence failure on their part.
2. Apply a factor
Cognitive biases render individuals susceptible to being ‘fallible and prone to error.’ Many intelligence analysts have been prone to making costly mistakes and significant oversight due to their preconceived notions and biases that can produce costly errors. The main cognitive bias we can apply to the intelligence failure of the Christ church mosque shooting is faulty risk perception. This cognitive bias stems from people's responses to hazards that they perceive. If their perceptions are faulty, efforts at personal, public and environmental protection are likely to be misdirected.’ Whilst conducting risk assessments, people are still likely to include a large component of subjectivity that may cause errors in judgement, for example, missing key information or judging an event ‘as likely or frequent if instances of it are easy to imagine or recall.’ This means we can say that humans are prone to making incorrect or ill-informed decisions based on their own prior experiences and ideas, that don’t allow for a full analysis or data available. In the intelligence world, a frequently seen aspect of faulty risk perception is base rate neglect; the underweighting of information or data in favour of other data. People are more likely to favour more ‘intuitively appealing’ information that engages with their past experiences or previous mindsets of that particular intelligence community.
When applying this bias to our case study, we can see that New Zealand’s Intelligence services were unprepared for the attack because they simply couldn’t imagine it- they had never experienced far-right extremism, as most of New Zealand’s experience with terrorism had come from protests. It is therefore plausible to argue that the likelihood of far-right violence happening was ignored- the intelligence agencies suffered from base rate neglect, ignoring the probability of this happening because it had never previously happened. In the official report commissioned post terrorist incident, it was found that ‘New Zealand had not been the subject of recent terrorist attacks. The apparently low threat of terrorism, controversies associated with the intelligence and security agencies and associated public suspicions as to their activities and utility, meant that the agencies had limited social licence, political support and funding.’ This provides an explanation as to why the intelligence services missed potential signs of extremism from the terrorist- because they didn’t have any experience of this previously, therefore it didn’t seem a feasible event. Although this report does attribute other social and political factors as reason for this intelligence failure, it still certainly highlights that the lack of experience of far-right violence played a major role in this. Furthermore, it is also plausible to suggest that the Intelligence agencies were unaware of extremist far-right activity because of their focus on islamic extremism. It has been argued that base rate neglect is intensified when multiple problems arise, but those more probable are put to the forefront- ‘‘participants are more sensitive to base-rates when given multiple problems with varying base-rate probabilities.’ This research goes on to argue that factors with a higher base-rate probability are given more importance and more weighting than those with a lower probability of occurring. The commissioned report also details that due to a resurgence domestically, but also internationally, of islamic extremism, any far-right extremism wasn’t seen as significant- ‘there was a focus on Islamist extremist terrorism as the presenting threat and only very limited resources were dedicated to understanding other terrorist threats.’ From this we can surmise that the intelligence agencies did indeed suffer from base rate neglect, which ultimately is what led to the intelligence failure that occurred at the christchurch mosque shootings. By overlooking the probability of emerging threats based on their own historical experiences and data, and due to broader international terrorism trends, intelligence agencies risk such catastrophic oversight.
3. Is it useful?
To fully understand the usefulness and validity of whether faulty risk perception can be seen as the main factor in the intelligence failure in Christchurch, the wider context of the nation’s government and security services must be examined.
According to multiple reports New Zealand’s government did not fully appreciate the threat of far-right terrorism. Far-right politics expert Paul Spoonley says that New Zealand has been complacent on far-right extremism and that there is minimal “formal information gathering on the groups within the country.” This indicates the New Zealand’s security services did not believe that the threat of far-right violence was particularly pertinent to the extent that there was little formal intelligence taskings focussed on the far-right. Reinforcing this point and in the context of faulty risk perception the Royal Commission report does state that failure to anticipate the attack partly stems from an “inappropriate concentration of counter-terrorism resources on the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism”
The faulty risk perception caused by status quo bias which is where the “where people choose to do nothing or maintain current or previous decisions without a change.” can arguably be seen in New Zealand’s overlooking of far-right extremism. In the royal commission inquiry Andrew Kibblewhite, the former Chief Executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet stated that “If you’d said “is there a terrorist risk out of right-wing extremism? I would have said “yes”, but… I probably would have used the precise words “I don’t think we are that concerned about it [in New Zealand]”. This arguably shows that there was an awareness of the threat of far-right extremism but because it was overshadowed by the existing threat of Islamist extremism it received very little attention, showing that the far-right extremism may have been overlooked because it is dwarfed by the ‘status quo’ of the existing measures against the threat of Jihadism. Further reinforcing this point is that fact that according to the inquiry “Before 2018, assessments by the National Assessments Bureau and the Combined Threat Assessment Group did not feature the threat of non-Islamist extremist terrorism.” It may be argued that this decision was made because in the past far-right extremism did not pose a genuine national security threat. However, faulty risk perception is evident here because extreme right ideology has existed in New Zealand for some time and most importantly far-right attacks increased 320% over five years preceding 2019 across western nations. Matthew Quinn the chief of a far-right disengagement organisation, said that many in government seem to think “white guys are just hooligans, they don’t feel like white guys are out there planning attacks.” It is evident that authorities perception of what a member of the far-right is clouded their ability to recognise the real and present risk of physical violence and terrorism.
However, the usefulness of using faulty risk perception to understand why this attack happened falls short in some respects particularly because it is very difficult to prove whether the there was sufficient information and intelligence to accurately determine the threat of far-right terrorism. As seen with the omission of far-right extremism from the National Assessments Bureau there was clearly a failure at the collection stage of the intelligence cycle as the NZ security services did not fail in their analysis of information on the far-right they made a decision to not expend any resources at all on understanding the far-right threat. However, the New Zealand Royal Commission report into the attack states that the Christchurch shooting was not an intelligence failure because “the gunman was a lone wolf which made it hard to identify and track him.” Naturally this may indicate that faulty risk perception is not particularly useful as there was no potential risk they could reasonably perceive in this instance so to speak. Therefore, you could argue there was no specific group that could have been targeted and assessed as a threat, therefore faulty risk perception appears less useful as it cannot be reliably determined that this attack was a result of misguided analysis. On the other hand, it is evident that the New Zealand government have overlooked the threat of far-right extremism more widely in general and they should not view that just because this specific attack may have been difficult to prevent due its lone wolf nature, faulty risk perception should not be disregarded as it is clear there was failure to understand the threat more widely not just in this instance.
Understanding that faulty risk perception was relevant in the failure to prevent the Christchurch attack can inform that security services ought to take a holistic view of the threat of violent extremism rather than overlooking certain threats because they may appear minute in the presence of groups that have recently posed a threat. Furthermore, faulty risk perception is useful in explaining why there was an intelligence failure in Christchurch as the far-right have in some cases been perceived as ‘hooligans’ not paying due attention to the possibility that some individuals sympathetic to far-right ideology may act upon their ideas through violent means. Overall, whilst it is difficult to fully attribute responsibility to faulty risk perception due to the lone wolf nature of the attack and lack of intelligence collection, New Zealand’s apparent overlooking of the threat of far-right extremism shows that faulty risk perception is still a useful concept in general and whilst may not be fully relevant in understanding how the Christchurch shooting came to happen and why it wasn’t prevented it does provide valuable insights into why governments should still have an awareness of threats that are justifiably a very low priority regardless.
4. Other cognitive biases that could be applied.
Throughout this essay it has been demonstrated that the cognitive biases of faulty risk perception are primarily responsible for the intelligence failure that occurred leading to the Christchurch Mosque shootings, however, it is necessary to acknowledge which other cognitive biases were also present in the intelligence services before the attack.
First, confirmation bias can be applied to the Christchurch Mosque shootings, as intelligence analysts found themselves focusing on information which sought to confirm their preexisting beliefs regarding the nature of attacks that could occur. Confirmation bias “is the tendency to try to confirm rather than disprove previous beliefs and attitudes and has been held accountable for failures in intelligence analysis in the past.,” Indeed in the years before the attack, previous incidents were perceived as isolated and not indicative of a larger trend. This can be evidenced by the fact that in the years prior to the Christchurch mosque shooting New Zealand had experienced a low level of terrorist activity, with the primary focus of the intelligence services being placed on preventing overseas infiltration, as demonstrated by the investigation into alleged Mossad operations in 2011. The Historical context of no prior homegrown terror attacks occurring in New Zealand led to a confirmation bias among intelligence analysts, ultimately hindering the level of critical thinking. As a result of confirmation bias the warning of radicalisation within domestic communities through online activities was overlooked.
Secondly, Anchoring Bias was present within NZSIS, which in turn had a detrimental effect on the intelligence service overall, with intelligence assessments being anchored on initial hypotheses about the nature of terrorism within New Zealand. The anchoring bias is a cognitive bias that causes an individual or group to rely and depend on the first piece of information received, with the initial information serving to anchor all future thoughts. The perceived wisdom within the New Zealand intelligence services suggested that the threat would originate from foreign extremist groups, with the idea of local radicalisation being overlooked. This anchoring of ideas led to intelligence analysts underestimating the potential for homegrown extremism, an issue exemplified by the need to begin bias training for staff of the New Zealand police and Security services as a result of the Royal Commission into the attack. This demonstrates that anchoring bias held back intelligence analysts, as despite the Christchurch mosque shooter's involvement in online white supremacist forums and his extremist ideologies, analysts failed to update their risk assessment, with the views remaining anchored in the threat coming from Islamic extremism.
Thirdly, Groupthink impacted the views of intelligence analysts involved, as within the New Zealand intelligence services group dynamics and pressure to conform to pre-existing consensus views inhibited the ability to evaluate threats critically. Groupthink occurs when a dominant figure within a group of people or organisations suggests a view which may be flawed, however, due to the perceived dominance of the figure, the potentially flawed views are incorporated by the organisation as a whole. The prevailing assumption that the primary terrorist threat to New Zealand came from external sources meant that those expressing the idea of domestic terrorism were marginalised, leading to an inadequate assessment of the risk possessed by the Christchurch mosque shooter. This idea can be further seen within NZSIS in the aftermath of the Christchurch attack, with Professor Siracusa stating “Entrenched bureaucrats typically ran the agencies, and were threatened by original thinkers, while rewarding "groupthink" which was usually conservative,..To break with groupthink required recruiting "heretics" who thought outside the box.” From this, it can be demonstrated that Groupthink was a present cognitive bias, with the prevailing ideas that domestic terrorism was not a primary threat dominating thinking, with alternative perspectives being marginalised and dismissed.
Finally, the misapplication of experience led to intelligence analysts overlooking and misinterpreting emerging patterns, as a belief that the past would repeat itself hindered the level of critical thinking employed by New Zealand intelligence analysts. Misapplication of experience can be defined as the act or process of using information, such as a nation's history with terrorism, in a way that it was not intended or which may be detrimental in the longer term. Within the intelligence services, there was a primary focus on threats from international extremist groups rather than lone actors, with a self-radicalised individual with a far-right extremist ideology not being considered. This idea can be furthered by looking at historical attacks against New Zealand, with incidents such as the Rainbow Warrior bombing of 1985 possibly influencing the thinking of intelligence analysts. The Rainbow Warrior bombing was conducted by foreign operatives and served to increase the level of effort placed on external observation by NZSIS rather than internal surveillance at the expense of recognising and addressing domestic radicalisation. The misapplication of experience hindered the intelligence efforts of those involved and prevented efforts to uncover the emergence of homegrown extremists such as the Christchurch mosque shooter.
Therefore it can be suggested that the cognitive Confirmation bias, Anchoring Bias, Groupthink and the Misapplication of experience were all present within the NZSIS preceding the Christchurch shooting, with this impacting all areas of the intelligence cycle, However despite the existence of these cognitive bias, they all ultimately stem from faulty risk perception on the part of the intelligence community. The presence of faulty risk perception reinforced the aforementioned cognitive biases and prevented mitigation, ultimately allowing for the attack to occur and leading to changes aimed at Significantly increasing the focus of NZSIS and ensuring the connectivity of groups to identify and discuss shared national security concerns.
5. What can be done about the mitigation?
As we have explored the faulty risk perception enabling the Christchurch attacks to occur, it is crucial to also delve into how this could have been mitigated and how intelligence services could have prevented the attacks. As mitigation refers to the reduction of harmful effects, one must consider how to minimise the possibility of faulty risk perception and the subsequent effects. The solution to this seems obvious; critical thinking in intelligence and risk analysis. However, in the case of New Zealand, especially “after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, security agencies in Australia and New Zealand, like their counterparts in the United States, shifted their focus to the urgent threat of radical Islamism.” This prevented the New Zealand Intelligence Service from accurately identifying risks of terrorist acts from the far-right.
In terms of mitigation, the New Zealand intelligence community should have considered risks of terrorism much more broadly, rather than focusing almost solely on Islamist threats, and even redefined the issues they were exploring in threats and terrorism. Knowing that terrorist threats stem from political dissonance in terms of Islamist threats against the West, it would have been essential for the New Zealand intelligence community to consider that if this could occur from a Western source directed against the Islamic community in New Zealand. Especially as there had been a spike in far-right attacks in the West. With the Christchurch attacks occurring in 2019, if the intelligence community of New Zealand had taken seriously their aims of focusing new investigations into far-right extremism in response to the Charlottesville attack taking place only two years prior, they should have been able to intervene before the Christchurch attacks took place.
The Charlottesville attacks in the United States saw a far-right, white supremacist carry out an act of domestic terrorism following a ‘Unite the Right’ rally, after which he drove his car directly into counter-protesters. Similarly to New Zealand’s intelligence failures in monitoring online content posted by Tarrant ahead of the Christchurch attacks, the United States also neglected to take those posted by Fields as “less than a month before the attack he posted an image on Instagram showing a car plowing through a crowd of people]”. This identifies a key failure of intelligence systems in the monitoring of online activity as Tarrant had also been consistently accessing far-right websites and even donating to such organisations. Following the Charlottesville attack, New Zealand vowed to devote a greater focus on far-right threats; however, there had been no emphasis on there being severe issues surrounding online radicalisation.
Furthermore, the reports of the intelligence failures in New Zealand have caused much debate, with the government insisting the attacks were unpreventable from the evidence gathered, there are other texts arguing that “multiple opportunities to take steps to prevent the development of modern modes of terrorism in New Zealand were simply never taken.” This text in particular explores how alternative approaches to terrorism intelligence analysis could have prevented the attacks and discusses the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior and the Ananda Marga plot to bomb the Indian High Commission, demonstrating the diversity amongst the few terrorist threats New Zealand has been faced with over the years. This reinforces the potential for the mitigation of the Christchurch attacks as, being aware of the diverse history of threats to New Zealand’s security, intelligence services should have considered more broad risks than just Islamist threats.
Moreover, it is insisted that “the patchwork of clues discovered by police after the massacre - including his steroid abuse, a hospital admission after he accidentally shot himself, and visits to far-right websites - would not have proved enough to predict the attack]”. However, Tarrant’s use of social media may not have been enough to cause concerns, but the lack of investigation and regulation surrounding his procurement of firearms, even after shooting himself, demonstrate layers to the intelligence failures. It can be argued that having taken just one of these incidents seriously, they likely would have led to the discovery of one another and enabled the authorities to identify Tarrant as a threat, and thus, the application of a high-impact low probability analysis could have prevented his attacks.
Therefore, in future, all forms of extremism must be taken much more seriously by governments and intelligence services must work closely with social media platforms to ensure threatening, extreme, and violent posts are being actively investigated and dealt with as the Christchurch attacks demonstrate that online content may in fact become more than just hate speech.
6. Conclusion
In Conclusion, through underlying the events preceding the 2019 Christchurch mosque shooting, it is evident that faulty risk perception was primarily to blame for the intelligence failings within the NZSIS. Faulty risk perception was present at all levels of the intelligence services, with intelligence analysts incorrectly assessing primary risk faced by the people of NZ, with those in power reinforcing this perception by emphasising the risk posed to the nation from foreign Islamist extremism. Faulty risk perception is a highly useful cognitive bias from which the intelligence failures leading to the 15th of March attack can be viewed, as while other cognitive biases such as Confirmation bias, anchoring bias, Groupthink and misapplication of past experience were all present within the NZSIS, they stemmed ultimately from an incorrect perception of the risk posed by homegrown right wrong extremism. Therefore, it can be suggested that by applying faulty risk perception to the Christchurch Mosque shootings intelligence failures, the core issues can be analysed, allowing for future intelligence practitioners and government members to employ mitigation and develop future programs to prevent a repeat of the aforementioned failures.
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