In the twenty-first century is HUMINT still fundamentally necessary to understanding adversaries' capabilities and intentions?
The twenty-first century has seen incredible development in the methods of gathering and the types of intelligence gathered on adversaries. Ultimately, HUMINT remains fundamentally necessary to understand an adversary's capabilities and intentions in the twenty-first century as humans underpin all of intelligence. Intelligence is itself an inherently social affair whereby Humans attempt to gain information about other Humans, to use the information to their benefit. One must first define key terms to understand why HUMINT is still fundamentally necessary to understand an adversary's capabilities and intentions. HUMINT can be defined as Human intelligence, the use of Human assets to gain and acquire intelligence. Indeed Nato defines HUMINT as “Human intelligence” … is intelligence gathered using interpersonal contact, as opposed to the more technical intelligence gathering disciplines such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT)” Furthermore to properly answer the question at hand one must understand what is meant by the terms “capabilities” and “intentions”. Capabilities will be defined as “the ability to do something”, with intentions being defined as “something you want and plan to do”. With these key terms defined, one can now look at the role of HUMINT in the twenty-first century and understand whether it is still fundamentally necessary. Ultimately it can be argued that indeed HUMINT is still fundamentally necessary to understanding an adversary's capabilities and intentions. HUMINT provides insights into an enemy's capabilities which many other forms of intelligence will fail to provide. Furthermore, HUMINT allows intelligence agencies the ability to better understand an enemy or adversary’s intention, providing insights that other methods of intelligence may be unable to provide. Even in the digital age, the above statements are true because, ultimately, intelligence always has been and will remain a social and human endeavour, which requires humans to interact with one another to create the environment in which intelligence agencies and their methods of intelligence gathering can operate. Whilst it can be argued that the mass influx of data and subsequent reliance on technology in modern intelligence has changed the role of Humans in intelligence, it would be wrong to suggest that HUMINT isn't still fundamentally necessary to the understanding of an adversary's capabilities and intentions. Therefore, it can be argued that even in the twenty-first century HUMINT still remains fundamentally necessary to the understanding of an adversary's capability and intentions.
First one can argue that in the twenty-first century, HUMINT is still necessary to understanding an adversari’s capabilities, providing an irreplaceable base of knowledge and perspective into an adversari’s capabilities. Intelligence has throughout history been vital to those in power, as it allows them to make decisions with more confidence and better understand the situation they find themselves. As a part of this, it has always been necessary for military commanders and political leaders alike to understand the capabilities of their adversaries. This is because understanding the capabilities of an enemy enables a leader to understand the risk they find themselves in, as a nation with limited capabilities could be considered a lesser threat, and vice versa. The value of HUMINT itself is that it can enable intelligence agencies to gain access to areas they otherwise would not be able to enter using other methods of intelligence gathering, such as TECHINT or SIGINT. This idea is evidenced in the case of Col. Penkovsky, who provided key information to the British and American intelligence agencies from 1960 to 1963. The value of Penkovsky and HUMINT as a whole can be seen in the phrase “Nevertheless, HUMINT successes like Col. Penkovsky, Adolf G. Tolkachev, and a host of others—including several who managed during the Cold War to penetrate the Soviet intelligence services underscore how crucial the payoff can be from classical espionage.” From this, it is clear to see the large value that HUMINT can provide. In this case specifically, Col. Penkovsky, who himself photographed over 5,000 military documents and files. With this being said it is still necessary to place the role of HUMINT within a twenty-first-century context. Whilst the aforementioned point demonstrates the overall role that HUMINT plays in intelligence it is necessary to understand the role HUMINT plays in understanding adversary capabilities in the twenty-first century. The role HUMINT plays in understanding an adversary’s capabilities in the twenty-first century can be highlighted by Wippl, who states, “In 2016, the case for intelligence is stronger than ever. To say that the CIA needs to penetrate terrorist groups that intend to harm the West is trite. Sources are needed to report on foreign secret weapons programs and the proliferation of components for WMD. In these endeavours, the CIA and other IC components must work unilaterally, as well as cooperatively, with numerous countries, again dependent on time and place, to achieve these objectives.” This quote clearly demonstrates the need to continue to invest in HUMINT in the twenty-first century. as Wipple states, the CIA needs to penetrate terrorist groups, an action which can only effectively be done by human assets, which can provide information other sources simply cannot. Finally, when looking at the role HUMINT plays in the twenty-first century with regard to understanding an adversari’s capabilities, it is important to look at how HUMINT is still fundamentally necessary due to the Human element of intelligence. Indeed, this idea can be seen by DCI Tenet, who states, “ former DCI Tenet emphasises that intelligence is still ‘primarily a human endeavour.”27 He is obviously not referring to the government’s intelligence budget priorities. Recall that the United States devotes only a small percentage of its annual intelligence budget to human spying.28 Spy machines are costly, while human agents are relatively inexpensive to hire and sustain on an annual stipend”. The very nature of HUMINT means it cannot be replaced, even as technology advances. Due to the nature of technology HUMINT is still fundamental in intelligence to the understanding of an adversary's capabilities. Therefore, it can be argued that in the twenty-first century HUMINT is just as valuable and fundamental to intelligence as in any other period of time. The ability to use Human sources to gain information on an adversary’s capabilities is irreplaceable, and whilst technology has advanced in the twenty-first century, there is no question that due to the human nature of intelligence, HUMINT is still irreplaceable as a means of intelligence gathering. As a result, it can be argued that HUMINT is indeed fundamentally necessary to understanding an adversary’s capabilities.
Furthermore, it can be argued that HUMINT is still fundamentally necessary in the twenty-first century to understand an adversary’s intentions, being able to provide information other sources are unable to provide. HUMINT is able to provide information on an adversary’s intentions as human sources are able to access areas other sources may not be able to access. Even with the increasingly rapid development of technology, a satellite or radar scan, no matter how detailed, is still unable to report on the intentions of an enemy force. To be able to understand the very Human idea of intention, it is necessary to use Human sources. This idea can be clearly seen in the Arguments of Johnson, who states, “Space cameras cannot see into factories where missiles are made, or into the sheds of shipyards,” writes an intelligence expert. “Photographs cannot tell whether stacks of drums outside an assumed chemical-warfare plant contain nerve gas or oil, or whether they are empty.”29 As a U.S. intelligence officer has observed, we need “to know what’s inside the building, not what the building looks like.”30”. This quote highlights one of the fundamental benefits of HUMINT when compared to other intelligence-gathering means. For all of the modern developments in technology, it is still virtually impossible to obtain information regarding the specific intentions of a state or person without the adversary themselves stating their intention openly or a human asset obtaining the information. An example of where this has occurred in the twenty-first century would be that of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq. This is highlighted in the quote, “Perhaps the most useful public example of HUMINT effectiveness is the Sunni Awakening movement in Al Anbar province, Iraq. This movement spurred a series of similar movements throughout Iraq after it took off in 2006. Around the same time, according to the RAND Corporation team studying the issue, the use of ISR was proving somewhat ineffective since from 2003-2006 insurgents in that area grew dramatically. This in spite of the massive use of technical ISR (Grant, 2009).” This demonstrates the nuanced yet crucial role HUMINT plays had the same level of intelligence gathering been attempted by other means, it is unlikely that it would have been as successful, as having human assets involved proved to be pivotal in the successful completion of the mission. Finally, it should be understood that whilst HUMINT is still fundamentally necessary to understanding an adversaries intentions, it does not mean that HUMINT operates without the use of modern innovations. Indeed, advances in technology have increased the importance of HUMINT in the intelligence environment as technology complements HUMINT as opposed to replacing it. This idea is agreed by Frederick, who states “Humint will also be strongly dependent on technology, for quick reporting and sharing of information. It will also extend to non-traditional sources of information… The only factor that remains constant in the world of espionage is the subject on which it acts: the human being, with all his quirks, complexities and, thank goodness, weaknesses and vulnerabilities.” From this quote, one can deduce the importance that HUMINT plays when combined with other INTs, notably TECHINT, as technology becomes a larger, more integrated part of people's lives in the twenty-first century. Indeed, to further evidence the invaluable role HUMINT plays in modern intelligence, one needs only to look at the 9/11 terrorist attack and the failure of intelligence gathering sources to integrate. Johnson himself states, “one well worth pursuing if the United States is determined to prevent another 9/11 catastrophe. The prudent policymaker will continue to seek information from all the collection sources, overt and across the covert “ints,” with human intelligence continuing to have a valuable role to play.”. From this, it is clear to see the role HUMINT plays not only as an intelligence source but also as a method of homogenising and synthesising other methods of intelligence sources. Therefore one can argue that despite the increased development in technology and the use of diverse intelligence-gathering methods, HUMINT still remains fundamentally necessary to the understanding of an adversary's intentions.
However, some may choose to argue that in fact, HUMINT is no longer fundamentally necessary in the twenty-first century to understand an adversari’s capabilities and intentions because advancements in technology have made HUMINT irrelevant and highlighted the major weaknesses present when using Human assets. Humans are by their very nature susceptible to being influenced by outside forces. Indeed, throughout the history of intelligence, there has been evidence of Humans being influenced by outside forces. One primary way in which some may choose to argue that HUMINT is no longer fundamentally necessary to the understanding of an adversary's capability and intentions would be the fact that human sources are constantly at risk of politicising intelligence. Some may choose to argue that Intelligence, especially gathered via HUMINT, is especially vulnerable to being altered or reported in a way which benefits their own political positions. Indeed there is evidence that U.S presidents have thought as much as can be seen in the quote “The CIA has no problem when a consumer challenges the assessments, but when the President suggests that the assessments were arrived at for political ends, it’s possibly the worst thing you can accuse the CIA of doing. In the business, it’s called ‘politicising” intelligence, and it’s considered a mortal sin.” Therefore, some may choose to argue that in fact, HUMINT is no longer necessary to understanding an adversary's intentions and capabilities and instead HUMINT only serves to provide politicised intelligence. However, those who choose to suggest this idea fail to properly understand the way in which all intelligence is, to a degree, subject to the bias of those tasked with analysing it, with the intelligence cycle ultimately being unable to fully remove bias. As such, there is an accepted level of bias present within intelligence agencies, and there is an acceptance that intelligence personnel, whether field agents or analysts, should try to prioritise the truth above all else. Indeed David Gio commented on as much when Donald Trump came to office in the quote “Recruiting foreign spies and stealing secrets to inform policy decisions probably wasn’t what the Apostle John had in mind when he originally wrote those words, but it does represent the CIA's mission to seek truth (factual, not divine) above all else. For CIA officers, it’s about public service, a meaningful way to make a difference, and, though it may sound trite, patriotism, but not the fragile kind”. From this, it is evident that the Human nature of all intelligence places every INT at risk of being influenced by the bias of those who report the information to their superiors, and as such, should not be used as a critique of HUMINT itself. Finally, some may choose to suggest that the increased use of technology in the twenty-first century has removed the fundamental role that HUMINT traditionally played in intelligence gathering. Those who believe this could choose to argue that the use of Satellites and UAVs has allowed for a far greater level of accuracy than HUMINT sources could provide. Furthermore, the use of supercomputers to analyse billions of data files has removed the need for HUMINT assets. However, the reality is quite the opposite, with an overinvestment in non-HUMINT assets in fact, leading to intelligence failings. This can be evidenced by the quote, “Berkowitz pondered the accusation levelled by some at the US intelligence machinery in particular, that a growing Cold War infatuation with sophisticated technical intelligence gathering, particularly in the areas of SIGINT and IMINT, had led to a parallel neglect and reduction of traditional HUMINT capabilities. If such a neglect had occurred, it proved very problematic in the post-Cold War era, when new, more dynamic and less state-centred targets emerged on the scene, and the somewhat ‘Fordist’ intelligence production line found itself poorly equipped to cope.” From this, it is evident that an underinvestment in HUMINT ultimately led to a lowering of the capability of the United States intelligence services. Therefore, one can argue that HUMINT is still fundamentally necessary to understanding an adversary's capabilities as it not only is necessary to confirm the intelligence gathered by other more technologically advanced means but also allows for in-depth analysis of the intentions and capabilities of an adversary which may otherwise be unattainable.
In conclusion, it is evident that HUMINT is still fundamentally necessary to understand an adversary’s capabilities and intentions in the twenty-first century and remains a key component of modern intelligence gathering as it has done since the beginning of intelligence. Indeed, it can be argued that as a result of developments in technology and other methods of intelligence gathering, there has become an increased need for HUMINT and it has become far more fundamental. Indeed, this can be seen in the quote, ‘Cooperation between human and technical intelligence, especially communications intelligence, makes both stronger. Human sources ... can provide access to valuable signals intelligence ... Communications intercepts can validate information provided by a human source.’. This epitomises the place that HUMINT has in modern intelligence and highlights how fundamentally necessary HUMINT is to understanding an adversary's capabilities and intentions in the Twenty-first century. HUMINT can provide not only intangible intelligence, which is able to extend beyond images and communications gathered by other intelligence-gathering means, but also the ability to understand the thoughts of other humans, as well as gain insights into buildings and other areas which may otherwise be inaccessible. Ultimately, intelligence remains an inherently Human exercise and as such HUMINT remains as fundamentally necessary to understanding an adversary as ever before. Therefore one can argue that despite the large development in technology in the twenty-first century, HUMINT remains fundamentally necessary to understanding an adversaries capabilities and intentions, being able not only to homogenise, understand and synthesise information obtained from other intelligence-gathering means but also because HUMINT takes advantage of the Human nature of intelligence, proving to be inherently indispensable in the obtaining of information regarding intentions and capabilities of adversaries.
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