Is Libicki correct to doubt the feasibility of strategic cyberwar?
Strategic cyberwarfare has become an area of great contention and geopolitical discourse over recent decades, being driven by the increasing digitisation of modern societies and the growing reliance on digital infrastructure seen by many nations around the world. First, strategic cyberwar can be defined as “the actions by a nation-state or international organisation to attack and attempt to damage another nation's computers or information networks through, for example, computer viruses or denial-of-service attacks.” Potential impacts of strategic cyber warfare in the 21st century include that of serving to escalate conflicts as well as undermine national security and threaten the stability of established global bodies. Despite this Martin Libicki thinks that strategic cyberwar is very much limited, with himself expressing doubts about the feasibility of strategic cyberwar, arguing that attribution difficulty, limitations of cyber capabilities, and defensive measures and resilience make it an ineffective strategy. Ultimately, whilst there are undoubtedly uses for strategic cyber warfare, such as that demonstrated by Stuxnet, Libicki is correct to doubt the feasibility of strategic cyber warfare in the majority of cases, with it best being used as a secondary tool as a part of a wider strategy.
First, it is necessary to understand why Libicki doubts the feasibility of static cyber warfare by analysing his key works. In “Cyberspace in Peace and War” a clear outlining is obtained of his main arguments, one such argument being that of attribution difficulty. Libicki suggests that due to the nature of cyber operations having the ability to be launched from multiple vectors and techniques, it is often difficult to attribute responsibility for an attack. This according to Libicki can lead to ambiguity and confusion, ultimately resulting in making it hard to achieve clear substantial military or political objectives through strategic cyber operations. Libicki raises concerns about the limitations of cyber warfare capabilities, including the need for costly maintenance and investment to ensure effectiveness. Additionally, he argues that the scope and scale of potential targets are limited, making it difficult to achieve decisive results through cyber operations. Finally, the issue of defensive countermeasures and system resilience poses a significant challenge to the feasibility of strategic cyberwarfare. Effective defensive measures can mitigate strategic cyber threats, making it challenging to accomplish military or political objectives through cyber attacks. Furthermore, systems can create resilient and secure backup infrastructures which can recover from cyber attackers minimising impact and limiting their long-term effectiveness. Libicki’s arguments are both compelling and contentious, providing an accurate depiction of the challenges associated with strategic cyber warfare whilst also overlooking some ways in which these challenges could be mitigated. In the eyes of Libicki “Strategic cyberwar speaks to the U.S. deterrence posture. At the risk of being a little unfair, this raises the question: Are we serious about cyberattacks as a warfighting tool?”. This sentiment speaks to Libicki’s view on strategic cyber warfare, however, his work fails to encompass crucial factors that could impact the feasibility of strategic cyber warfare. For example many issues associated with attribution difficulty can be mitigated by improved intelligence capabilities and better forensic analysis techniques. Furthermore, cyber capabilities could work in tandem with more conventional military and diplomatic tools to achieve complementary objectives, such as undermining morale. Nevertheless, Libickis arguments hinge on the idea that Cyber Warfare itself is self-limiting, never possessing the power alone to be a feasible tool when employed independently. He suggests “Depletion is both specific and general; the damage from cyberattacks may be self-limiting in ways that do not apply to other attacks.” This idea has proved to be accurate, as despite the aforementioned factors which could be used to mitigate the perceived weakness associated with strategic cyber warfare, they can never overcome the inherent limitations connected with cyberwarfare by its very design.
However, it is necessary to analyse the argument against Libicki and look at the alternative perspective that supports the feasibility and deployment of strategic cyber warfare. One key argument often raised against Libicki’s ideas on the feasibility of strategic cyber warfare is that of technological advancements. The ever-increasing development of cyber capabilities combined with emerging technologies such as Artificial intelligence can create an environment in which developing and deploying cyber tools can become far more efficient, increasing the likelihood of potent and effective strategic cyberwarfare in the future. Another argument often levelled against Libicki is that there is undoubtedly a growing reliance on digital infrastructure within modern societies. For example, 80% of those living in the United Kingdom use online banking, creating a large and possibly vulnerable target for a cyber attack. This serves as just one example of new areas in the 21st century for cyber attackers to achieve their objectives through the use of cyber attacks. Lastly, some choose to suggest that Libicki is wrong because past successful cyber-attacks can be used as a precedent for the feasibility of strategic cyber warfare. Attacks such as the Stuxnet attack in 2010 on an Iranian nuclear facility are suggested as proving the potential impact of cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and as a result national security.
However it is in this example that the flaws in these counterarguments emerge. For instance, the Stuxnet attack was in development from 2005, and ultimately resulted in incredibly minimal disruption. The attack, whilst proving to be a watershed moment in the evolution of cyber-attacks, demonstrated the limited long-term capability of cyber warfare. Furthermore, while technological advancements in cyber capabilities such as Artificial intelligence have the potential to increase the potency of cyber warfare, it is necessary to consider the limitations of these capabilities and the countermeasures that can be used to thwart them. Similarly, while growing reliance on digital infrastructure creates new vulnerabilities and attack surfaces, it also creates new opportunities for defensive measures and resilience. Ultimately it is in the writing of John Stone that Libicki’s arguments for cyberwarfare can be exemplified “since Liddell Hart, has been predicated on minimising loss of human life by employing advanced military technique to strike rapidly and accurately at the material components of the enemy’s means of resistance.” it is in this aim that cyber warfare can be best utilised, as argued by Libiki himself, with cyberwarfare working in a supplementary roll to integrate itself within a wonder more well rounded strategic infrastructure, using military, diplomatic and cyber tools to implement a holistic strategic plan, as evidenced in the phrase “Furthermore, there are good reasons to believe that its contribution to warfare, while real, is likely to be modest, while its contribution to the strategic war is a great deal easier to imagine than to substantiate.” Therefore despite the arguments against Libicki’s theory, there is a lack of evidence to suggest that the deployment of strategic cyber warfare instead of that of conventional military or diplomatic methods would reap any additional benefits, limiting its utility to that of a supporting and supplementary role as a part of a wider all-encompassing strategic approach.
In conclusion, Libicki's doubts about the feasibility of strategic cyberwar are well-founded and supported. His arguments centred around the attribution difficulty, limitations of cyber capabilities, defensive measures and resilience are all valid and need to be considered, especially when considered under the guise of strategic cyber safety. While some may choose to suggest there is a place for strategic cyberwar, these arguments fail to hold up to scrutiny, ultimately failing to provide sustained proof suggesting that strategic cyber warfare would hold advantages over other conventional methods. Libicki states, “As a reality, it may not cause enough cumulative damage to make the target cry uncle— but could create enough annoyance to exacerbate a bad relationship. Attacks, once both sides start engaging in them, may be hard to terminate through mutual agreement. Although these may not be proofs against the wisdom of strategic cyberwar, they do suggest that cyberwar is neither an efficacious adjunct to nor an adequate substitute for more conventional forms of strategic coercion.”. Therefore it would be correct to suggest that despite the specific use cases and potential for the use of specific cyber attacks, Libicki is correct to doubt the feasibility of strategic cyberwarfare, with its implementation being better suited to that of a secondary role supporting a wider more well rounded strategic approach.
Bibliography
Cyber warfare (no date) RAND Corporation.(Accessed: February 26, 2023).
Available at: https://www.rand.org/topics/cyber-warfare.html
Libicki, Martin. Cyberspace in Peace and War, Second Edition, Naval Institute Press, 2021
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kcl/detail.action?docID=6554553.
Jon R. Lindsay, Tipping the scales: the attribution problem and the feasibility of deterrence against cyberattack, Journal of Cybersecurity, Volume 1, Issue 1, September 2015, Pages 53–67, https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyv003
John Stone (2013) Cyber War Will Take Place!, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36:1, 101-108, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2012.730485
Libicki, Martin C. "Why Cyber War Will Not and Should Not Have Its Grand Strategist: SSQ." Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 1, 2014, pp. 23-39. ProQuest,