From al-Qaeda’s perspective, the 9/11 attacks were a spectacular failure. Discuss.

The attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States (US) on September 11th, 2001, resulting in 2,977 deaths, was the largest act of terror conducted by al-Qaeda. However, to say that the attack was a success from al-Qaeda’s perspective would be incorrect as the attack itself would mark the beginning of a slow and steady decline of al-Qaeda and its operations, leading to the group’s dwindling current status. To understand exactly how the 9/11 attacks were a considerable failure, one must first understand what the goals and aims of the attack were as well as those of al-Qaeda themselves. For this essay, terrorism will be defined by Hoffman “as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”.  With this definition, one can look at the accuracy and legitimacy of the statement and establish that in actuality, the attacks were a failure from al-Qaeda’s perspective. Indeed, the failure of the attack can be broken down into three distinct themes. First, the strategic objectives of the attack ultimately failed as well as failing to create a major rift between the US and its allies. Secondly, one can look at the unintended consequences of the 9/11 attacks for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Finally, it is necessary to look at the erosion of support and symbolic setbacks that al-Qaeda faced as a direct result of the 9/11 attacks. Ultimately, whilst the attacks were a momentary tactical victory for al-Qaeda, over the following 22 years, the attack proved to be a strategic misjudgment by the leadership of al-Qaeda, with the attack proving to be a considerable failure from al-Qaeda’s perspective in the long term.

First, to establish how the 9/11 attacks were a failure from al-Qaeda’s perspective, one must look at the strategic objectives of the attack and its impact on the US foreign policy allies in the Middle East. Firstly, one can look at how the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror did not destroy the US’s ability to operate in the Middle East with the aid of local allies. This can be evidenced by the increased level of democratisation by nations such as Bahrain and Kuwait, an idea furthered by Rabasa stating, “Since 2001, parliamentary elections have been held in Bahrain and Kuwait, and a new constitution has been drawn up and approved by referendum in Qatar.”  Furthermore there were dramatic changes in nations linked to al-Qaeda directly such as “in Pakistan, where President Musharraf presented himself as a bulwark against Islamic extremism, and the nation’s Inter-Service Intelligence directorate shifted from working with extremists to opposing them.”. This shift was not anticipated by al-Qaeda and Bin Laden, who had assumed that the attack would lead to Muslim-led nations cutting their support to the US. Whilst a select few in the Arab world “found some satisfaction in the idea that America’s nose had been bloodied”, the governments of nations such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan did not publicly support the attacks nor cut ties with the US, ultimately failing to do as al-Qaeda had hoped.

Furthermore, the 9/11 attacks caused an increased level of isolation and condemnation from nations previously sympathetic to al-Qaeda. Indeed, this is an idea evidenced by Kepel, who “contends that the ‘savage violence’ of terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda has worked against them. Rather than inspire other Muslims to take up arms against the West or apostate regimes, they have instead disgusted their coreligionists, leading them to reject extremism.”. This idea is evidenced by nations such as Saudi Arabia, a nation from which 15 of the 19 hijackers were nationals. Whilst Saudi Arabia as a state did not support al-Qaeda, many non-state actors supported al-Qaeda with links to the Saudi Arabian Government, supported by Brisard’s report which “asserted that al-Qaeda received between $300 million and $500 million during the decade before 2002, by “abusing this pillar of Islam [charitable donations] and taking advantage of the Saudi regulatory vacuum.” Despite there being clear support for al-Qaeda before the attack, the aftermath saw Saudi Arabia distance itself greatly. Indeed, al-Qaeda itself began attacking Saudia Arabia in May 2003, with the Riyadh compound bombings, which killed 39, demonstrating clearly that rather than garnering great support in the Middle East, the attack served only to isolate al-Qaeda from primarily Sunni Muslim nations. 

Finally, the 9/11 attacks failed to accomplish al-Qaeda’s overarching goal of creating an Islamic Caliphate. Osama Bin Laden had hoped that the attack would pave the way for the creation of a unified Islamic authority, one where the ideas of al-Qaeda were shared. This was demonstrated when he stated after the attack, “Thus the whole World awoke from its sleep …. which is a very good sign and a great step towards the unity of Muslims and establishing the Righteous Islamic Khilafah insha-Allah.". Despite the chaos and destruction caused by the September 11th attacks, this hoped-for strategic ambition of the creation of an Islamic caliphate failed. The only tangible argument to suggest otherwise is the existence of caliphates in the form of terrorist groups linked to al-Qaeda, many of whom, however, predated the 9/11 attacks and, as such, were not born out of the attack, suggesting that the 9/11 attacks did not serve to help in their creation. Therefore, it can be argued that whilst there was an undoubted short-term impact of the attack on the World Trade Center, the attack itself failed to achieve its strategic objectives and alter the US’ relationship with its allies in the region. Moreover, the attack failed to create a religious uprising within the Middle East, with the ideals of an Islamic caliphate failing to gain widespread support. As such it can be deduced that the September 11th attacks were a long-term failure from al-Qaeda's perspective. 

Secondly, one must consider the number of unintended consequences that occurred as a result of the 9/11 attack. First, whilst the 9/11 attacks were a shock to the US, the attack served only to motivate the US to deploy more decisively in the Middle East. Indeed, on the 7th October 2001, Afghanistan was invaded, an invasion invited by al-Qaeda as Ridel states, “their objective was to provoke the US and its allies to retaliate: specifically, to invade Afghanistan.”. The direct military invasion, however, would end on the 17th of December 2001, costing the lives of only 13 Americans, compared to a suspected 15,000 Taliban and al-Qaeda casualties. This invasion led to the leaders of al-Qaeda, such as Osama Bin Laden, to go into hiding in the mountains of Afghanistan away from American airpower, as well as the removal of the Taliban government. Whilst the leaders of al-Qaeda alleged after the 9/11 attacks that the goal was to provoke a response, it is undoubted that they had assumed the response would be similar to that of the Soviet forces in 1980, and not one which would lead to the near destruction of all conventional al-Qaeda operations within Afghanistan in weeks. Therefore, one can assert that whilst the attacks did provoke a response as intended, the response was far more effective than the leadership of al-Qaeda anticipated, leading to the group’s need to flee into hiding to prevent destruction.

Furthermore, the 9/11 attacks led to the Global War on Terror (GWOT), a war which, while flawed, was one that greatly decreased the combat capability of groups such as al-Qaeda. The GWOT would prove to be a blank cheque for the US military to persecute groups linked to the 9/11 attacks as they saw fit. This high level of operational freedom and the minimal level of justification needed for action led to an increase in military operations, evidenced by the presence of 130,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan after the invasion, as well as the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Whilst al-Qaeda had hoped this mass build-up of military force would lead to the Middle East turning against the US, this was not to occur, with many nations remaining neutral. This increase in military action led to targeted killing, commented on by Jenkins: “ Many of its most effective operational planners and commanders also have been eliminated; either captured or killed before or since Bin Laden's death.”. The dismantlement of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and the death of the group leader who had called for the 9/11 attacks as a direct result of the GWOT serve as unquestionable evidence that when analysed over any extended period, the attack of September 11 is ultimately a failure from al-Qaeda's perspective.

Thirdly, the 9/11 attacks led to a decrease in support for the cause of al-Qaeda, as whilst the attacks led to the most radical believers joining the cause, many more people were dissuaded from supporting al-Qaeda. This idea is given credence by Bari who writes “Some (Muslims) see it as a catastrophic act of terrorism that resulted in the deaths of 3,000 Americans and the demise of the Taliban’s Islamic government; that it distorted the image of Islam and Muslims, brought about the American invasion of both Afghanistan and Iraq.” This idea can be evidenced by the neutrality of nations such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, who had previously aided al-Qaeda. Another case of condemnation would be from the king of Morocco who “denounced the attacks and called upon Muslims to remain religiously tolerant and moderate.” Denunciations such as this were widespread across the Middle East, with the Maghreb nations universally condemning the attacks. The call for Muslims to remain moderate and tolerant had a nullifying effect, limiting the level of support for al-Qaeda, with the further condemnation from limiting al-Qaeda’s ability to recruit. Therefore, it can be suggested that when looked at over an extended period, the 9/11 attacks were a considerable failure from al-Qaeda's perspective, as in the years after the attack, its operational capability would be nearly destroyed.

Finally, when looking to conclude as to the success or failure of the 9/11 attacks, the increased counter-terrorism measures taken as a result of the attack must be considered. First, the 9/11 attacks led to a drastic increase in the level of attention placed on security and counter-terrorism measures within the US, with the subsequent commission into the intelligence failings forcing the US to reevaluate its counter-terrorism machinery. Changes were made such as heightened security at airports, with a change in internal security practices, codified in the Patriot Act also. These measures would hinder al-Qaeda’s ability to perform future attacks, with Hanson writing “Since September 11, 2001, over 45 terrorist plots have been uncovered and foiled in the US; al-Qaeda, as a terrorist threat, seems regionalized and without the ability to inflict mayhem on a similarly large scale on the Western world”. This is evidence that whilst the attack itself was a great shock to the US, the subsequent years have seen an unprecedented increase in security and counterterrorism measures, hindering the effectiveness of al-Qaeda. Without the ability to spread its message through acts of extreme terror and violence, the group’s relevance has dropped considerably, with each foiled plot serving only to strengthen the US and its allies’ resolve against the group. Therefore, it can be argued that the attack caused a great increase in the counter-terrorism capability of the US, thereby undermining al-Qaeda's operational capabilities.

However, it would be wrong to suggest that the 9/11 attacks were a spectacular failure, as whilst they may have failed to achieve their longer-term strategic aims, the short-term tactical significance of the attack cannot be disregarded. The attack cost the lives of 2,977 innocent people, not only this, but economically, the US was impacted: “The property damage alone cost about $100 billion, and estimates of the total economic damage inflicted by the attack range up to $2 trillion.” The psychological impact of the attack is also necessary to note, with it being the first time the mainland of the US had been attacked since World War Two. The impact is mentioned by Mohamedou, noting “Osama Bin Laden’s plan vis-à-vis the US was ambitious and it has been successful…. Bin Laden has become the most powerful and the most respected Arab political figure”  The attack on the World Trade Center created headline news across the world, with Bin Laden specifically using the publicity to his great advantage, recording many video addresses to the people of Islam urging them to follow in the group’s lead in attacking the US. From this, one can infer that the attacks on the World Trade Centre were of short-term value for al-Qaeda, both creating mass fear and panic within the US as well as allowing for the spreading of al-Qaeda's message.

On the other hand, whilst the attack was a short-term success for al-Qaeda when looked at over an extended period, the failures of the attack become apparent. First, whilst the 9/11 attacks prompted the creation of many splinter groups associated with al-Qaeda, these splinter groups lacked a base of operations as alluded to by Byman: “From perspective, however, the situation is also unsatisfactory. Although the organisation has scored important successes in bonding similar organisations to one another and spreading its worldview, it remains far from exercising direct political control over a state.” Furthermore, the 9/11 attack would always struggle to be considered anything other than a long-term failure as evidenced by Byman: “Terrorists ‘win” through the psychological damage they spread, not through the physical carnage they inflict.” This is highlighted by 9/11, as while there was a short-term feeling of fear within the American populace, this was overtaken by a desire for those responsible to be brought to justice. Al-Qaeda failed to make terrorism a tactic, and in the years following the attack, the network would be forced to disperse, without the capability to carry out attacks on the scale seen during 9/11. Therefore, it can be argued that whilst a short-term tactical victory for al-Qaeda, over an extended period the attack can be considered a failure, with the increased counter-terrorism measures implemented limiting the group’s ability to conduct further operations.

To conclude, the 9/11 attacks were a great tactical and propaganda victory for al-Qaeda in the very short term, however, this success would soon dissipate. Indeed, through the analysis of the strategic failures of the attack, the unintended repercussions, and the ultimate failure to instil an Islamic uprising, it can be deduced that the attack was a long-term failure. The limitation of suicide attacks such as 9/11 is highlighted by Pape: “suicide terrorism is unlikely to cause targets to abandon goals central to their wealth or security, such as a loss of territory that would weaken the economic prospects of the state or strengthen the rivals of the state.” The inherent limitations behind such attacks and the terrorist strategic dilemma meant that for al-Qaeda, their chances of longer-term success were minute. Indeed, despite the group remaining in existence into 2023, the group is fractured, disorganised, and unable to muster an attack of substantial scale as a direct result of the 9/11 attack. This idea is summarised by Hanson: “​​ After 9/11, al-Qaeda saw its popularity plummet. Most of its key operatives are either dead or in hiding. Bin Laden’s death proved anti-climactic.” The attack, whilst the most destructive single act of terror against the US, ultimately failed to achieve any of the outlined strategic objectives of al-Qaeda. Indeed, the attack marked the beginning of the slow destruction of the group's operational effectiveness, as well as the start of the systematic elimination of the group’s leadership. Therefore, it can be deduced that while the 9/11 attack was not a spectacular failure from al-Qeada’s perspective as it was a tactical victory in the short term, it was a considerable long-term failure that marked the beginning of a steady decline to a place of insignificance.

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