What are the key intelligence challenges to Russia’s intelligence community and how are/can these be overcome?'
What are the key intelligence challenges to Russia’s intelligence community and how are/can these be overcome?'
To understand the challenges facing the Russian Intelligence Community (RIC) one must first understand Russia’s intelligence structure. RIC is separated into five agencies; first, there is the Main Directorate of Special Programs of the President of the Russian Federation (GUSP), secondly, there is the Federal Security Service (FSB), thirdly is the Federal Protective Service (FSO), fourthly is the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and finally there is the Main Intelligence Directorate (G.U.). The formation of these agencies after the Cold War is described by Davies and Stewards, “Under Boris Yeltsin there was a short-lived effort to recast the old ‘special services’...The sprawling KGB was dismantled and ... Only military intelligence, the GRU, escaped untouched and unreformed because it was subordinate to the Ministry of Defence and not the disgraced Communist Party. The challenges faced by the RIC can be broken up into three distinct sections, firstly that of technological challenges encompassing matters of cybersecurity and technological lag, secondly that of human and physical challenges such as ethical concerns and Russia’s extensive geography, and finally geopolitical and international relations challenges such as the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the everpresent tensions with Western Intelligence agencies. For the challenges to be overcome however, would require drastic and systemic changes.
Firstly, the technological challenges that Russia faces in the 21st century include cyber security, technological lag within the RIC, and combating social media exploitation. Russia is not unaware of the threat and potential of cyberattacks, indeed in the first year of the war in Ukraine, “the CSIS research team identified 47 publicly attributed cyber incidents indicative of a campaign initiated by Russia between November 29, 2021, and May 9, 2022…. it is likely only a small but representative sample of the larger population of intrusions.”. The attacks conducted by the RIC are primarily conducted by the GRU and often attempt to destabilise government bodies as well as disrupt society. An example of such disruption would be the cyber attacks against Estonia as a result of the ‘Bronze Soldier Crisis’, conducted from the 27 April to the 18 May consisting of “Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, website defacements, email spamming and posting of automated comments.”. These attacks whilst providing limited gains, also create a challenge to the RIC. Despite some operations being conducted internally via the GRU, other operations are conducted by groups such as Cyber-Riot and Green-Dragon, creating a weakness for the RIC, as they can be far more easily compromised as compared to government organisations. Furthermore, the RIC’s cyber-community is vulnerable, an example being the email account of GRU Unit 26165’s leader, Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Alexandrovich, being leaked by Ukrainian-linked hackers. Whilst the RIC finds itself in a position to employ cyber attacks, it would be necessary to reinforce and strengthen the cyber security measures of the RIC, as the increased use of cyber-attacks increases the likelihood of retaliatory attacks creating a possible vulnerability.
Furthermore, the RIC faces challenges concerning technological lag, with Russia operating several antiquated systems as well as lagging behind Western states in research and development (R&D). Russia invests heavily in its armed forces and security; indeed in 2021, 2.3 trillion Russian Roubles were spent on National security and law enforcement according to the federal budget, with $66 billion being spent on the Russian military in 2021. However, there is a lack of spending on R&D, especially concerning technologies that can increase the RIC capability, such as satellites. This is evidenced in the quote, “Domestic expenditures on R&D were planned in 2020 at the level of 3% of GDP, but in fact amounted to only 1.1%. Actually, the indicator of R&D expenses relative to GDP (1%) has been stagnating for almost 13 years.”. This level of spending falters in comparison to near-peer rivals such as the United States, which spent approximately 3.4% of its GDP on R&D. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the lack of military satellites, greatly limiting the capabilities of the RIC concerning TECHINT and SIGINT. For the RIC the challenge they face is diverting increased spending from the military to intelligence, with funds currently being diverted to areas such as hypersonic missiles. The only remaining method to overcome the challenge is that of a change of government policy concerning RIC spending.
Lastly, not combating the misuse of social media poses a considerable challenge if left unchecked. The advent of social media has created a new interface through which the spreading of disinformation can be achieved. The conflict in Ukraine provides an example of the RIC attempting to wage a war of disinformation where “Ukrainians are being forced to record disinformation videos accusing Ukrainian neo-Nazi regiments of committing war atrocities.” Acts such as this, whilst intended to spread disinformation on social media via the use of unwilling participants, often fail. Another example of Russian disinformation would be the “thousands of fake accounts on Twitter, Facebook, LiveJournal, and vKontakte” maintained by Russian propagandists.” The primary issue with disinformation campaigns is that the information is, by its very nature, incorrect, and with the advent of social media, many more people can discover the truth, weakening the RIC’s credibility. Whilst during the Cold War campaigns of disinformation were effective due to the limited availability of information, the advent of social media paired with technology such as Virtual Private Networks enabled the public to absorb events on a level never before possible. The RIC must understand the challenge created by employing such tactics, as such actions garner international condemnation as well as increase the likelihood of public dissent from within Russia. Indeed the RIC must seek to increase its output of accurate information to improve its credibility, additionally increasing the level of action taken against inaccurate claims made by nations opposing Russia. Therefore, it can be argued that RIC faces several technological challenges which, if left unmet, could lead to increased friction in years to come; however, with increased technological development and thoughtful consideration of the RICs methods, many of these challenges can be combated but would be reliant on government policy shifts.
Secondly, the RIC faces human as well as geographical challenges, such as ethical issues leading to an inability of the RIC to function effectively and the geographical size of Russia. The RIC faces several ethical challenges; some are inherent within intelligence work, and others are challenges of self-making. One of the ethical issues unique to the RIC is the lack of separation between foreign policy activities and the intelligence services. This is highlighted in the quote, “‘special activities’ and ‘‘covert actions’ tend to indicate that they are made of separate stuff from the substance of foreign policy, but ‘‘in the Soviet view,... no such distinctions are apparent.’’ Whereas a Western ambassador might baulk at purposefully deceiving an interlocutor for fear of losing credibility, the Byzantine, Russian, or Soviet diplomat would not.” The RIC brings itself into further ethical disrepute by its continued policy of assassinating former agents. This is highlighted by the Litvinenko Poisoning of 2006 and, more recently, that of Sergei Skripal, both occurring in the United Kingdom. Whilst such actions may serve to prevent desertions from within the RIC, they show the RIC to be a cold, brutal force that often resorts to violence. Whilst all intelligence agencies operate within an area of ethical ambiguity, the RIC could benefit from re-evaluating its approach to ethics, If the RIC was seen to be ethically superior, it would be able to garner far more international favour as well as increase its capability to protect Russia's national security interests.
Furthermore, the RIC faces many challenges from an extreme level of internal conflict. While a common theme throughout global intelligence agencies, the friction is more often than not minor. This is not the case in the RIC, where respective branches seek to promote their position whilst holding back others, often to the detriment of the RIC. This can be evidenced by Galeotti, who writes, “The competition is less visible and bloody and is fought through attempts to outperform and embarrass rivals and acquire the information that will most please the powers that be. … the Foreign Intelligence Service and the GRU collect virtually identical economic information.” This is not an effective method of intelligence operation, nor does it allow for an environment of cooperation. Furthermore, Putin has created a system whereby “The agencies have overlapping responsibilities …This is a carnivorous, cannibalistic system – as the former electronic intelligence service FAPSI discovered when it was devoured, largely by the GRU and FSB”. These issues stem largely from the politicisation of the intelligence services, with Putin rewarding success and punishing failure, as was shown by the GRU’s treatment after the failed 2008 Georgia operations. To overcome these challenges the RICs must seek to dissuade political interference and create steadfast boundaries for which each intelligence branch would operate. However, the likelihood of such changes being implemented is low, as the ever-present competition prevents a single agency from gaining a large amount of support, which could threaten Putin.
Lastly, Russia is the largest nation on earth, which provides subsequent security concerns. This is evidenced in the quote, “The basic problem with Russia’s strategic security is the length of its land frontiers, which span a distance of 23,000 kilometres. For this reason, one of the KGB’s main tasks under the Soviet Union was to protect the frontiers. Almost all national security problems are directly connected to the situation with the frontiers:” The RIC is forced to devote a disproportionate amount of time to the surveillance and mitigation of threats that arise from neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the RIC, chiefly the FSB, is fearful of the strategic vulnerabilities that bordering 14 nations can pose. An example of this hindering the RIC would be “Immediately after the Rose Revolution, (when) Putin sought to undermine Georgian democracy, ultimately invading in August 2008”. This gross overaction from the 2003 Rose Revolution of led to the 2004 Orange Revolution and ultimately the current Ukraine situation. For the RIC the challenge of Russia's large area and many borders cannot be simply eliminated, but rather gradually overcome by the re-creation of an independent border force not linked to the RIC, which could help against drug trafficking, smuggling, and infiltration, reducing the national security risks posed by the expansive borders. Therefore, the challenges that face the RIC concerning human and geographical challenges, such as the large scale of Russia and the RIC ethical ambiguity, whilst not insurmountable, would require sweeping governmental change.
Thirdly, geopolitical and international relations challenges have a direct impact on the long-term capability of the RIC, with tensions against Western agencies and a high level of political interference ever-present issues. The USSR and the United States were the primary protagonists of the Cold War, and as such, a state of non-cooperation was present; however, with the collapse of the USSR, closer relations were developed. Indeed, “relations have always been compartmentalised, with areas of co-operation co-existing with competition and rivalry. In the 1990s and early 2000s and during the Medvedev presidency , cooperation prevailed over competition.” This cooperation would end with the rise of Putin, ultimately ending completely with the invasion of Crimea by Russia, with the RIC increasingly turning to China for assistance. The RIC would fall victim to the wider lack of cooperation by failing to address Islamic Terrorism, especially in the Northern Caucuses, exemplified “on December 29, 2013, when a female suicide bomber killed at least 15 people and injured more than 40 at the train station and in the southern Russian city of Volgograd”. Whilst it cannot be guaranteed that increased cooperation would have stopped the attacks, it could likely have aided in the surveillance of the bomber by the RIC, as she had links to Islamist Terrorist organisations, well known to Western intelligence agencies. The RIC will struggle to overcome these challenges, however as they stem from the entrenched position of Putin, who possesses large levels of control over the intelligence services, preventing the creation of shared intelligence agreements as were present before 2014.
The high level of political interference remains a challenge for the RIC, which, whilst present from the Byzantine Empire, has increased in recent decades with the rise of Putin. The USSR saw an understandably high level of political interference in matters of intelligence, as the services existed for the party first and the state second, and whilst the collapse of the USSR has seen a change in the way politics interacted with the intelligence services, the interference remains high. This is exemplified by Gaff, who writes, “As one might expect, Putin’s control of intelligence and security agencies remains almost unchallenged.” This results in the RIC acting for Putin first and the nation second, Further examples of Putin hindering the RIC would be his use of the intelligence services to pursue his enemies seeking refuge in foreign nations. This is best evidenced by “14 deaths in the UK of Russian business figures and British individuals linked to them”, prompting an investigation by the Chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee citing considerable evidence that the RIC was involved. These challenges can be overcome by increasing the level of legislation around the RIC to protect it from political interference, with political oversight replacing interference as seen in Western nations. However, this is unlikely as Putin is in a position of authoritarian power, and control over the intelligence services is vital to him.
Finally, the impact of globalisation on intelligence operations has been considerable, and the RIC’s inability to adapt has created many challenges. The advent of social media and fast, affordable travel has made for more global cooperation and interconnection. In Russia, however, primarily due to political ideals, there has been an effort to remain somewhat isolated from the globalised world. Indeed, this is evidenced in the phrase “All foreign policy is driven by domestic political concerns, and this maxim also extends to a hyperconsciousness bordering on paranoia at the extent to which unrest reflects external influence. Russian claims that the 2013–2014 Euromaidan protests in Ukraine or the 2011–2012 Bolotnaya protests in Russia were instigated, encouraged, and manipulated by the West. This isolation and fear of the West hinder Russia in combating global intelligence threats. Indeed, during the war on terror, Russia and NATO cooperated in combating Islamic terrorism, which enabled both to achieve success by the sharing of information more effectively. However, “in 2014, in response to Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine, NATO suspended practical cooperation with Russia” This has led to a decrease in Russia's effectiveness against groups such as ISIS. The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has made overcoming the challenge toward the RIC concerning globalisation far harder, as the invasion has faced global condemnation and isolated Russia further. As a result, it can be stated that whilst there are several clear and present challenges to the RIC as a result of geopolitical international cooperation issues, many of them simply cannot be overcome without a drastic shift in the leadership of the state itself.
In conclusion, the RIC finds itself in a position of weakness concerning its ability to overcome challenges. While methods to overcome the respective challenges exist, the RIC lacks the ability, in large part, to implement any necessary change, as to do so would be to invoke a shift in the very makeup of the Russian state. The continued failure to address challenges has begun to decrease the effectiveness of the RIC. As highlighted by Waller “In contra-distinction to its apt and aggressive reading of the ground-level Ukrainian political ecosystem in 2014, Russian intelligence failures in 2022 turned an attempted regime-change operation into a grinding regional war of attrition, with its political objectives, forcibly downgraded and its military and economy both substantially degraded by the conflict.” The intelligence failure that led to the start of the war in Ukraine and the subsequent actions of the agencies within Ukraine such as “FSB officers having been reported to interrogate, torture, and inspect social media accounts as well as personal messages of Ukrainian civilians” are both indicative of the state of the RIC today. The RIC finds itself hamstrung by Putin, able only to limit the consequences that the aforementioned challenges have, as to take action would require the change of the current authoritarian regime, possibly to the RIC’s short-term detriment. Therefore one can argue that the RIC cannot overcome the challenges it faces due to the political environment present within Russia.
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