Why did counter-insurgency operations fail in Afghanistan?
The counter-insurgency (COIN) operation in Afghanistan faced a myriad of challenges, which ultimately led to the mission's failure. The conflict initiated on the 7th of October 2001 would last 20 years, with a total of $145 billion being spent in an attempt to rebuild Afghanistan, with a further $837 million being spent by the United States Department of Defense on warfighting. With “2,443 American troops and 1,144 allied troops killed and 20,666 U.S. troops injured…. At least 66,000 Afghan troops have been killed. More than 48,000 Afghan civilians have been killed,”. These numbers do little to reflect the enormity of the COIN campaign waged in Afghanistan. The coalition forces engaged in Afghanistan consisted primarily of American and British forces, complemented by NATO allies forming the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which would operate in Afghanistan from December 2001 until December 2014, This essay will primarily focus on the period between 2001 and 2014 as, despite ongoing military involvement after 2014, the bulk of COIN efforts were ended with the dissolvement of ISAF. Despite the high level of investment by ISAF nations both on fighting the Taliban and rebuilding Afghanistan, the COIN operation would ultimately fail, despite tactical victories. The reasons for the COIN operation’s failure in Afghanistan can be dissected into three themes: of strategic, cultural, and geopolitical challenges. The strategic challenges, such as a lack of clear objectives and insufficient coordination, when combined with cultural challenges such as a failure to understand local dynamics and political challenges such as the shifting political environment, highlight how the combined armed forces of ISAF failed in their COIN operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
First, to understand why the COIN operation in Afghanistan failed, one must look at the strategic challenges, specifically the lack of clear objectives, poor coordination among coalition forces, and inadequate civil-military integration. During the COIN, coalition forces found themselves repeatedly hamstrung by a lack of clear objectives from which to measure success. Whilst the initial goal of the war was that of retaliating against al-Qaeda and eliminating Afghanistan as a safe haven for extremism, after the invasion ended in December 2001, the goals became blurred. For any military force to be effective, a clear objective must be established. The lack of an objective is highlighted by three U.S. aid officials who stated, “By the time you were finished, you had so many priorities and aspirations it was like no strategy at all. If you have 50 priorities, then you don't have any priorities at all." Furthermore, there was an overlap between the enemy and civilian population, as highlighted by a U.S. military advisor stating, “At first, they thought I was going to come to them with a map to show them where the good guys and the bad guys live. At first, they just kept asking. "But who are the bad guys, where are they?". These accounts both highlight the difficulty faced by those on the ground. Indeed without clear objectives, it became ever more challenging to measure success and adapt relevant COIN strategies, a problem which would hinder the ISAF mission throughout their campaign.
Furthermore, within the coalition forces in Afghanistan, there were repeated cases of poor coordination between ISAF forces, greatly hindering their effectiveness. Coordination is key when engaged in protracted COIN operations. For ISAF, however, a group composed of 13 nations, this proved difficult, especially when coordinating air and ground assets. An example of this failure in COIN operations would be that of “Operation Medusa in which a US A-10 fighter-bomber aircraft inadvertently strafed a Canadian army battle position, killing one soldier and wounding 36 others”. This incident highlighted the lack of coordination between ground and air assets as well as different ISAF nations. Furthermore, there was a lack of coherent and agreed upon strategy within ISAF, highlighted by the difference in strategic outlook on force by the United Kingdom and Norway. Hansen demonstrates this writing “The Norwegian perspective of force was strikingly different .. (with) the use of force only as a last resort and after 2005 made its use of force contingent on UN-support. In contrast to the UK, the Norwegian government did not see the utility of its armed forces, instead arguing for the utility of other tools and actors.” This level of disagreement and the lack of coordination greatly hindered the ISAF effort in Afghanistan, Therefore, one can infer that the COIN operations in Afghanistan were greatly hampered by an inadequate level of coordination among coalition forces.
Lastly, when looking at the strategic challenges that led to the coalition's downfall one must look at the failure to adequately integrate civilian and military efforts. For the U.S., USAID and those in charge of its operations within Afghanistan did not appreciate the environment present within Afghanistan from 2001. This can be evidenced by a U.S. Army civil affairs officer who said, “I shared an office with USAID. The problem with USAID is that they are not designed to turn on a dime. They had a slow 5 year plan. What happens at a national level doesn't work in a COIN environment. They had to become more expeditionary.” This highlights not only the failure of agencies to understand the COIN environment but also serves to demonstrate interservice friction. Furthermore, there was a failure to integrate the ISAF military operations with the Afghan Civil Infrastructure, as highlighted in the quote, “(missing) were considerations of civil-military integration to elevate the host nation as a strategic ally with stable politico-economic parameters. Instead, there was an evident tendency to correlate short-term military tactical victories with strategic outcomes.” This epitomises the attitude of the military forces involved, with civil rebuilding efforts seen as an afterthought by many military commanders. Therefore, it can be argued that the COIN operations in Afghanistan failed due to strategic challenges posed by a lack of civil integration, clear strategic objectives, and a failure to coordinate adequately.
Secondly, there were ever-present cultural challenges, such as the failure to understand local Afghan dynamics, the increased alienation of the population, and the high level of corruption within Afghan institutions. First, the general naivety to Afghan culture and societal structures prevented the coalition forces from being able to implement an effective COIN strategy. There was widespread misunderstanding as to the nuances of Afghan culture from which hostility often arose. This is evidenced by Douglas Lute, who writes, “We were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan - we didn't know what we were doing. What are the demographics of the country? The economic drivers? AID: Really? We're going to do something in Afghanistan with $10 billion” … What are we trying to do here? We didn't have the foggiest notion of what we were undertaking”. Lute, who was the permanent representative of the United States to NATO from 2013-2017, stated that he was devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan, which highlights how widespread the lack of understanding was. This lack of cultural awareness is further evidenced by the quote “As Americans, we expect our will to be done,...We think we know “what right looks like”.” Such arrogance angered many Afghans, especially those who already saw the US and ISAF forces as occupiers, all of which served only to decrease the effectiveness of long-term COIN operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda as civilians would be more inclined to refuse to help the ISAF forces as well as being more likely aid the Taliban.
ISAF often found itself alienating large swathes of the local population, failing to invest in winning over the hearts and minds of the population. The necessity to win over the population and preserve life was one not lost on the leadership of ISAF, however, despite many attempts to mitigate civilian casualties, they remained a characteristic of the war. This can be highlighted “When on 17 July 2009, two weeks after the publication of McChrystal's directive, 13 civilians were wounded and at least five were killed in a U.S. close air support strike in Kandahar, Afghanistan.” Incidents such as this served only to aid the Taliban insurgency, allowing for anti-ISAF propaganda campaigns. Another incident that diminished the reputation of ISAF forces would be that of “December 5, 2003, (when) U.S. forces conducted an operation in the village of Kosween… As a result of the operation, a couple and their six children were killed”. This demonstrates how the violence of ISAF forces alienated large swathes of the population, turning people to aid the Taliban against ISAF. The inability of the coalition forces to win over the hearts and minds of the population of Afghanistan would allow the Taliban to have a constant stream of recruits who were willing to participate in a fight against the perceived invaders of their nation, ultimately hindering the success of any attempted COIN operations.
Additionally, when looking at the inability of ISAF to succeed in COIN operations, the high level of corruption present within Afghan institutions must be considered. ISAF forces operating in Afghanistan aimed to create a stable government and military that could take the fight to the Taliban. However, this effort was greatly hampered by mass corruption, as evidenced by the UN stating, “68 percent of citizens interviewed in 2012 considered it acceptable for a civil servant to top up a low salary by accepting small bribes from service users (as opposed to 42 percent in 2009). Similarly, 67 percent of citizens considered it sometimes acceptable for a civil servant to be recruited based on family ties and friendship networks (up from 42 percent in 2009).” These statistics highlight how corruption and bribery increased during the ISAF operation within Afghanistan. Furthermore, the large level of “Corruption within the security services was particularly damaging, undermining the cohesion and operational capacity of the army and police… the ultimate point of failure for our efforts... wasn’t an insurgency. It was the weight of endemic corruption.” As a result of the high levels of corruption present throughout Afghanistan, the ISAF forces failed to establish a stable state and armed force that had the mechanisms necessary to combat the Taliban. As a result, it can be argued that the COIN operations within Afghanistan failed due to cultural challenges such as the failure to appreciate local Afghan dynamics, the increased alienation of the population over time, and the high levels of corruption present within the Afghan state, military, and police.
Finally, geopolitical challenges were ever-present during the campaign in Afghanistan, such as bordering states providing support for the insurgents, the complex tribal and ethnic dynamics present, and the ever-changing global political landscape. First, the coalition forces in Afghanistan found themselves fighting an insurgent force that garnered support from bordering states. The battle against the Taliban, while centred in Afghanistan, did extend to bordering nations. An example would be Pakistan, evidenced when “On a February 2006 trip to Islamabad, Karzai presented the Pakistani president and his aides with a list of names, addresses, and phone numbers of ranking Taliban figures, more than implying that their presence and movements were with the knowledge and perhaps approval of Pakistan’s ISI.” Whilst the 9/11 attacks did lead to Pakistan cooperating with the Americans to a limited degree at the risk of economic and political isolation, Pakistan would remain sympathetic to the Taliban’s cause. Further evidence of Pakistani support for the Taliban can be shown in “A NATO study published in 2012 based on the interrogations of 4000 captured Taliban, al-Qaeda and other fighters in Afghanistan in over 27,000 interrogations concluded that ISI support was critical to the survival and revival of the Taliban after 2001 just as it was critical to its conquest of Afghanistan in the 1990s.” Combined, these highlight the difficulties facing the ISAF forces engaged in COIN operations, as the Taliban was able to operate with the support of a bordering state, which aided in the supply of weaponry and intelligence.
Secondly, tribal and ethnic divisions present within Afghanistan greatly complicated stabilisation efforts. Afghanistan is made up of 30 different ethnic groups, with the Pashtun being the largest. The largest tribe of the Pashtun is the Ghilzai, which would form the backbone of the Taliban. The complex task of identifying and cooperating with so many different groups is highlighted in the quote, “tribalism is not a feature of every ethnic group in Afghanistan; and even within tribally organised groups tribalism is a flexible concept that allows variations to exist and changes to occur as kinship groups rise and fall. Designations such as ‘tribe", "clan", "khel", "ethnic group" are often disputed; the following designations should not be construed as definitive.” This complexity allowed ISAF forces to inadvertently cause offence, highlighted by Johnson and Mason who write the ” United States and its NATO allies must undergo a sweeping change in recognition of Pashtun cultural realities. Most U.S. soldiers deploying to Afghanistan still receive little or no cultural or language training.” Despite this warning, no such training was to materialise, meaning that despite the clear resentment felt toward the U.S. by specific tribes in Afghanistan, little was done to mitigate their anger. This led to the Taliaban being able to increase the level of tribal support, with ISAF’s failure to understand the complexity of the tribal system only serving to increase the difficulty of the COIN operations within Afghanistan.
Lastly, the coalition efforts in Afghanistan spanned a great many changes in the global political landscape. The initial invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 occurred as part of the War on Terror, with the invasion being seen as an opportunity to remove the Taliban government from power. However, once the invasion was complete, the ISAF mission began to lack clarity as highlighted in the quote, “The policy to achieve those objectives and the implementation strategies have also been deficient and faulty. Years of incoherent, inconsistent, and shifting U.S policy with an unfocused mission resulted in a resurgence of Taliban, al-Qaeda and other Islamic Jihadists and ultimately prolonged the war in Afghanistan.” The prolonged nature of the conflict meant that in the US there were four Presidents involved in the overseeing of military operations, each possessing a different view on success. Furthermore, global shifting priorities lessened the investment into the war in Afghanistan as evidenced by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in 2016 stating “With a mounting world refugee crisis, the world is losing sight of Afghanistan and the plight of millions of its people.” This demonstrates that from 2014 and the ceasing of ISAF activity, the international community changed its priorities. From the evidence above it is clear that geopolitical challenges such as the support offered by bordering states, the complex tribal systems of Afghanistan and the geopolitical context surrounding the war all served to act toward the failure of the COIN operation within Afghanistan.
In conclusion, it can be argued that as a result of the strategic, cultural and geopolitical challenges faced by coalition forces in Afghanistan, the COIN operation failed. The war in Afghanistan was an example of a successful invasion turning into a failure of counter-insurgency. The ISAF forces themselves won many battles in Afghanistan, however, they failed to address the aforementioned challenges, allowing the Taliban to outlast ISAF forces. The failure of COIN efforts in Afghanistan can be linked to the inherent issues of successfully waging and defeating an insurgent force. Indeed, whilst all warfare is political and shifts based on human decision making, this is especially true in COIN. The United States sought to simplify and condense one of the more complex forms of conflict into something replicable and uniform without thought as to the environment or nuance of the specific situation” Therefore it can be deduced that despite many tactical victories in Afghanistan, the COIN operation itself was likely to fail over an extended period of time. The lack of a clear strategic aim combined with the cultural challenges posed and the geopolitical environment in which the war took place provided challenges that ISAF commanders could not overcome, and the Taliban could simply allow to slowly weaken the once powerful force that stood before them in 2001.
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